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In this Article we use game theory to argue that perceptions of
widespread corruption in the judicial processes in developing
countries create ex ante incentives to act corruptly. It is rational
(though not moral) to preemptively act corruptly when litigating
in the courts of many nations. The upshot of this analysis is to
highlight that, contrary to judicial narratives in individual
cases—such as the (in)famous Chevron–Ecuador dispute used
herein as an illustration—the problem of corruption in
transnational litigation is structural and thus calls for structural
solutions. The Article offers one such solution: the establishment
of an international court of civil justice.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article we use game theory to argue that perceptions of
widespread corruption in the judicial processes in many, usually lowincome, countries create ex ante incentives to act corruptly in
transnational litigation because such perceptions present the litigating
parties with a so-called prisoner’s dilemma. “Transnational
litigation,” as the term is used in this Article, is civil litigation
involving a foreign party—plaintiff or defendant—in the courts of

94 N.C. L. REV. 751 (2016)

2016]

TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION

753

another nation.1 A “prisoner’s dilemma” is a structure of strategic
action between rational actors in which it is individually rational to
not cooperate even though both parties would benefit from
cooperation.2 As it applies in the present context, understanding
judicial corruption as a prisoner’s dilemma suggests that both litigants
have an incentive to litigate corruptly, even when it would be
collectively rational to litigate honestly if they could trust one
another. In other words, it is rational—though not moral—to
preemptively act corruptly when commencing many transnational
lawsuits.
We illustrate the point in two ways. One is analytic, using game
theory to flesh out the strategic incentives applying to litigants. The
other is qualitative, illustrating our model by chronicling how
perceptions of corruption of the Ecuadorian judicial system
precipitated actual corruption in the (in)famous Chevron–Ecuador
dispute (“CED”), the longest-running transnational litigation, which
yielded the highest-ever environmental award, and which is generally
understood to be representative of relevant key features of
contemporary transnational litigation.3
The normative implication of this analysis is that, contrary to the
judicial, scholarly, and media-created narratives of individual cases
such as the CED, the Dole/Dow case (below), and others,4 the
problem of corruption in transnational litigation is structural rather
than a problem of corrupt individuals or corrupt corporations. By
1. American scholars usually focus on litigation with a foreign component in a U.S.
court. See generally, e.g., GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (5th ed.
2011); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS (2008).
2. See Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211
SCIENCE 1390, 1391–92 (1981).
3. For specifics on the ways the CED is representative for our purposes versus the
ways in which it is unique, see infra text accompanying notes 29–36. See also Theodore
J. Boutrous, Jr., Ten Lessons from the Chevron Litigation: The Defense Perspective, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 219, 219 (2013) (statement of the author, Chevron’s lead
defense lawyer) (“Of the many thorny issues raised by transnational litigation against U.S.
companies, the lawsuit that Chevron Corporation is fighting in Ecuador touches on them
all: legal ethics, weak and corrupt foreign judiciaries, litigation fraud, judgment
enforcement, third-party litigation financing, cross-border discovery, and international
arbitration . . . .”). But cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About
Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 263–64 (2004) (arguing that
the concerns over human rights and environmental transnational litigation are
overreactions); Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization”
of Transnational Litigation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 467, 468 (2013) (arguing against
treating the CED as representative of transnational litigation as a whole).
4. See infra notes 51–67 and accompanying text.
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saying the problem is structural, we mean that the landscape is
arranged in a way that pushes parties generally toward corruption. In
individual cases, a party may resist corruption, or corrupt acts may
not be available to that party, but the environment in which it
operates has a corrupting central tendency. As a structural problem,
the transnational litigation prisoner’s dilemma calls for structural
solutions. One possible structural solution—the establishment of an
international court for civil justice—is presented in Part III.5 This
argument is not meant to absolve litigants and attorneys—on either
plaintiffs’ or defendants’ side—who act corruptly. Rather, it is meant
to highlight that while there is certainly room for ex post civil and
criminal sanctions against litigants and lawyers who act corruptly, in
order to uphold the rule of law—in recognition of the fact that moral
agency is at play—there is also a great need for systemic, institutional
solutions to prevent corruption ex ante because of the structural
incentives that affect moral choices.
This Introduction starts by presenting the problem: dispute
resolution processes that comply with basic requirements of the rule
of law are important for global economic development from the
perspective of both Western economies and Western-based
multinational corporations, as well as the perspective of the
developing world and the world’s poorest. However, courts in many
countries are corrupt, perceived by litigants as such, or both, and
other dispute resolution fora are of limited relevance to key types of
transnational litigation. We also introduce the real-world case we use
to illustrate the prisoner’s dilemma we have identified, the CED. Part
I draws out the general problem of corrupt litigation with a prisoner’s
dilemma model. We provide a formal representation of the prisoner’s
dilemma in an Appendix. Part II draws on facts established through
extraordinary discovery and extensive judicial findings in the CED to
illustrate the likely perceptions of litigants in transnational litigation
and those perceptions’ effects on parties’ behavior. Part III explores
the normative significance of understanding corruption’s prisoner’s
dilemma structure and, after discussing a variety of structural
solutions, advocates for a bold solution: the establishment of an
international court of civil justice (an “ICCJ”).
5. Advocacy for an international court of civil justice (an “ICCJ”) to resolve crossborder mass torts and a blueprint for such a court is forthcoming in MAYA STEINITZ, THE
CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE (forthcoming Cambridge Univ.
Press 2018). A short essay by the same name previews the book: Maya Steinitz, The Case
for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014) [hereinafter
Steinitz, The Case for an ICCJ].
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A. Judicial Corruption and Its Significance to the Global Economy
Robust foreign direct investment (“FDI”) flows benefit both
capital-exporting nations, which tend to be developed nations, and
capital-importing nations, which tend to be developing nations.6 This
is the economic rationale that underlies the Bilateral Investment
Treaties (“BITs”) regime, which has seen explosive growth in the
recent past.7 There are now some 3,000 BITs, aimed at facilitating
FDI flows, and approximately 93 percent of those include dispute
resolution mechanisms.8 It is widely believed that FDI-derived
economic development, in the form of cross-border deals, cannot take
place without dispute resolution mechanisms that adhere to basic
requirements of the rule of law.9
Typically, a state is said to comply with the rule of law when its
powers are used against individuals only pursuant to rules that are
public, prospective, and general.10 Beyond these broad principles,
however, there is little agreement about what the rule of law
demands.11 There is, however, widespread agreement about its
importance: lawyers and philosophers generally agree that the rule of

6. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 45–
47 (2d ed. 2004).
7. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 57 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds.,
2015); cf. DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT? 195–96
(Theodore H. Moran et al. eds., 2005) (noting an “explosion” in FDI in the 1990s).
8. Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Provisions
in International Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey 7, 9 (OECD Working
Papers on International Investment 2012/02), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/WP-2012_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2FP-6C82]. There is now, however, a growing
discontent with the ICSID, defection from the system, and evidence that more defection is
coming. See Joachim Karl, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Government’s Dilemma,
COLUM. FDI PERSP., Feb. 28, 2013, at 2, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_89.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EL6G-4V35] (“Discontent is not limited to a few developing countries,
but has spread to the G-20 countries . . . .”); Mary M. Shepro, Punctuated Equilibrium and
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Bilateral Investment Treaties 4 (Apr.
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that the presence of dispute resolution
provisions in BITs follows a punctuated equilibrium model and therefore BITs are likely
to quickly shift away from such mechanisms) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, El Salvador, Indonesia, and Ecuador have all
recently disavowed BITs. See David Ma, A BIT Unfair?: An Illustration of the Backlash
Against International Arbitration in Latin America, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 571, 571 (2012).
9. See infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
10. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
94 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law and Equality, 32 LAW & PHIL. 565, 567
n.8 (2013); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137, 138–44 (2002).
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law imposes important moral demands on legal systems;12 economists
and political scientists often claim that the rule of law is important for
economic prosperity;13 and the United States and other developed
countries have very active rule of law development programs,14 as do
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and international
organizations, including the American Bar Association (“ABA”), the
World Bank, and many others.15 Preliminary results from one of our
empirical investigations on the subject, with a novel rule of law
measure, are consistent with the general supposition that the rule of
law facilitates economic development.16
Basic rule of law requires the availability of noncorrupt dispute
resolution processes.17 Judicial corruption may initially attract foreign
investors into developing countries, since such investors are likely to
be able to outbid local residents should their disputes come into
court. However, such legal misconduct is likely to lead to ultimate loss
of investments in the form of expropriative revolutions provoked by
rapacious business practices. This arguably occurred, for example, in

12. For examples of the lawyerly debate see, for example, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE
OF LAW 10–18 (2011); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 784–89 (1989). For examples of the
philosophical debate see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9
(1985); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 113–23 (2007);
ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 3–4 (2007); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210–12 (2d ed. 1979); Jeremy
Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008).
13. See generally Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre & Lydia Tiede, The Rule of
Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205 (2008) (reviewing
literature).
14. United Nations, NGO, and World Bank rule of law promotion efforts are detailed
in Kirsti Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives
and Lessons Learnt 4–6 (Soc. Dev. Papers, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Paper
No. 37, 2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/WP37_web.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YQF3-Q4WN]. The numerous U.S. rule of law programs are detailed in
SHAWNA WILSON, U.S. RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2011),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/RulLaw11.pdf/$file/RulLaw11.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2AMY-9DSS]. The ABA’s rule of law initiative is detailed at Am. Bar
Ass’n Rule of Law Initiative, Our Work & Research, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org
/advocacy/rule_of_law/about/work_research.html [http://perma.cc/2Y27-RKML].
15. See PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 2–3, 168–86
(2016) (describing global rule of law development industry).
16. See id. at 182–88 (presenting empirical results).
17. See Paul Gowder, Institutional Corruption and the Rule of Law, 9 LES ATELIERS
DE L’ETHIQUE/ETHICS F. 84, 94–96 (2014) (explaining the relationship between the rule of
law and corruption).
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Mexico and other Latin American countries.18 Accordingly, it is
reasonable to believe that corrupt dispute resolution procedures
impair economic development and thus are bad both for market
participants and ordinary citizens in both recipient and investor
countries.
The imperative to provide for a rule of law compliant dispute
resolution forum accounts for the existence of the World Bank’s
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”).19 The ICSID regime is widely understood as the linchpin
of foreign investment because it allows foreign investors recourse
against governments in the developing world without requiring them
to litigate in the courts of those nations. Foreign investors, in turn,
seek to avoid such courts because of perceived bias in favor of said
sovereigns, as well as perceived corruption.20
It is not only American multinational corporations and other
foreign investors, however, who require a forum for their grievances
that arise out of FDI. FDI is at times associated with unsound
environmental practices, human rights violations, unsafe labor
conditions, and other abuses.21 Consequently, the residents of the host
18. See generally Cole Blasier, Studies of Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico,
Bolivia, and Cuba, 2 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 28, 34–37 (1967) (reviewing literature
describing the combination of “absentee ownership,” particularly by U.S. investors,
economic maldistribution, and control of the government by (often foreign) business
interests as causes of revolutions in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba). The 2006 Ecuadorian
regime change—from a pro-foreign investor regime to a regime antagonistic to foreign
multinational corporations—was due at least partially to perceived abusive practices of the
latter. Cf. Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador’s Correa To Enact Hydrocarbons Reforms on
Monday, ECUADOR REP. (July 27, 2010), https://ecuadorreport.wordpress.com/2010/07
/27/ecuadors-correa-to-enact-hydrocarbons-reforms-on-monday/ [http://perma.cc/DPL3YAXR] (reporting that Correa threatened to nationalize Ecuador’s oil fields if foreign oil
companies did not abide by state policies).
19. See About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSID_Home
[http://perma.cc/UY33-BARJ].
20. See infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text; see also Jens Dammann & Henry
Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31–34 (2008)
[hereinafter Globalizing Commercial Litigation]; Henry B. Hansmann, Extraterritorial
Courts for Corporate Law 4–5 (Yale Law Sch., Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper No. 3,
2005) (suggesting that it would be desirable (and feasible) to have Delaware, and other
jurisdictions whose laws have extraterritorial reach, hold hearings and trials out of state).
In addition to fear of corruption and pro-host state bias, other common complaints against
courts in the developing world are discussed in GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 7–11 (2d ed. 2001).
21. See, e.g., AL GEDICKS, THE NEW RESOURCE WARS: NATIVE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL STRUGGLES AGAINST MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 13–38
(1993); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 452–60 (2001); John Ruggie, Report of the Special
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states also require a forum to pursue litigation arising from those dark
sides of FDI. ICSID provides no forum for such potential plaintiffs
because its jurisdiction extends only to suits brought by foreign
investors against host states with claims under BITs.22 U.S. courts—
always limited fora due to procedural and political hurdles such as
personal jurisdiction requirements and various due process
requirements—have been, for a generation now, progressively closing
their doors to litigation brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S.based corporations.23 The most recent and high-profile example is the
U.S. Supreme Court decision of April 17, 2013, in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum,24 which held that the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law applies to claims under the
Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”).25 This case is widely viewed as the
death knell to human rights litigation in U.S. courts against
multinational corporations for their actions overseas.26 The same
trend exists in the doctrinal developments in the areas of forum non
conveniens (“FNC”) jurisprudence, comity, and enforcement and
recognition jurisprudence.27 We will now describe our example of

Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 224, 236–46 (2011).
For the FDI-environmental connection in the case of the oil exploitation at the
Ecuadorian Orienté, see JUDITH KIMERLING ET AL., AMAZON CRUDE (Susan S.
Henriksen ed., 1991).
22. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, ch. II, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 174–75.
23. See William Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1577, 1577–78, 1606–07 (2013).
24. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
25. Id. at 1665.
26. See, e.g., Roger Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1749–54 (2013).
27. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWx), 2005 WL 6184247,
at *12–13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (preventing recognition and enforcement of a
Nicaraguan judgment on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction by the Nicaraguan court);
Franco v. Dow Chem. Co., No. CV 03-5094 NM, 2003 WL 24288299, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
20, 2003) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss on, inter alia, grounds of lack of
personal jurisdiction). Cutting-edge analyses of the developments in these areas, including
the phenomena of “forum shopper’s remorse” and the access-to-justice gap created by the
incompatible standards for forum non conveniens (“FNC”) versus foreign judgment
enforcement include Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010) (discussing the expansion of FNC and
prudential standing doctrines by U.S. courts to dispose of transnational litigation);
Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011) (discussing the
access-to-justice gap created by “forum shopper’s remorse”); Michael D. Goldhaber,
Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. COUNS. (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id
=1202445653516/Forum-Shoppers-Remorse-- [http://perma.cc/HH27-PMLL (archived
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such litigation, the CED, a mass tort action against a foreign investor,
to highlight the problems of corruption in non-ICSID litigation.
B.

The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute and the Contemporary
Transnational “Litigationscape”

On February 14, 2011, an Ecuadorian court issued an $18.2
billion judgment against Chevron in an environmental suit brought by
a group of forty-seven plaintiffs on behalf of some 30,000 indigenous
peoples in the Amazonian rainforest of Ecuador (the “Lago Agrio
Judgment” or “Judgment”).28 The litigation stems from personal
injuries and environmental damage in the form of the pollution of
rainforests and rivers in Ecuador. These damages were found by the
Ecuadorian court to be a result of oil-drilling operations conducted by
Texaco (which was subsequently acquired by Chevron in 2001) from
1964 to 1990.
The Lago Agrio Judgment is the largest judgment ever imposed
for environmental contamination by any court.29 The litigation has
been ongoing for more than twenty years with no end in sight (as
discussed below).30 The CED is, therefore, unique in certain respects.
The amount of resources devoted by both parties, but especially by
Chevron (estimated to have spent more than $1 billion on the
litigation and still counting),31 means that the dispute has taken on a
scope and character that is unusual. One unusual feature of the
with LexisNexis)] (discussing Chevron’s “forum shopper’s remorse” in the specific context
of the CED).
28. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 2003-0002, at 176–84 (Provincial Ct. of Justice
of Sucumbíos, Feb. 14, 2011) (Ecuador), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgement-English.pdf [http://perma.cc/CE5K-M8WG]. The
judgment was later reduced by the Ecuadorean National Court of Justice, Ecuador’s
highest court, to $9.5 billion, but was otherwise upheld. Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No.
174-2012, at 222 (Corte Nacional de Justicia Nov. 12, 2013) (Ecuador), http://
chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2013-11-12-final-sentence-from-cnj-de-ecuador-spanish.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6GWC-JD28] (reversing punitive damages but otherwise affirming the
judgment). The litigation is known as the “Lago Agrio litigation” after the oil field in
which the claimed injuries took place.
29. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38, 40,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/09/reversal-of-fortune-patrick-radden-keefe
[http://perma.cc/R6MD-SUSS].
30. The CED and its significance was the subject of the first symposium issue of the
Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation. See Symposium, Lessons from Chevron, 1 STAN.
J. COMPLEX LITIG. 199 (2013).
31. For example, New Yorker reporter Patrick Keefe estimated Chevron’s legal costs
at approximately $140 million a year. See Keefe, supra note 29, at 49; see also Patrick
Keefe, Presentation at the Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation Symposium: Lessons
from Chevron: Legal Ethics and Transnational Litigation (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=vnfR2ytP13U (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
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litigation is the aggressiveness of its tactics: Chevron has vowed to
litigate the case “until hell freezes over and then fight it out on the
ice” and promised that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs will endure a
“lifetime of litigation” if they “dare pursue their claims.”32 Chevron
has also sued or threatened to sue anyone aiding the plaintiffs.33
Other unusual features include the extent of the discovery;34 the
number of parallel proceedings; the significance of the litigation to
the Ecuadorian national economy;35 and the amount of third-party
funding received by the plaintiffs.36
However, with respect to perceptions of corruption and their
effect on litigation strategy, the relevant aspects of our analysis, the
CED is characteristic of transnational litigation rather than an
aberration. These characteristic aspects are, primarily, the de facto
32. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 12 n.8, In re Hugo Gerardo Camacho Naranjo,
No. 11-cv-0691-LAK (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2011). It is reported that the case could have been
settled for $140 million back in 2001. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Chevron Will Settle
in Ecuador, NEW YORKER (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why
-chevron-will-settle-in-ecuador [http://perma.cc/B3E8-F3ND]. In addition, it has been
known for at least three years that the case can be settled for under $1 billion because that
reservation point has been made apparent by the formula in the funding agreement
between Burford, an alternative litigation finance company, and representatives of the
plaintiffs, which became public in 2010. For an analysis of the alternative funding of the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ case against Chevron see Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance
Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 465–79 (2012).
33. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 32, at 25 (stating that Chevron
filed the RICO action “to intimidate and financially cripple its litigation adversaries”);
Paul M. Barrett, Chevron Sues an Online Poker Magnate Who Backed Plaintiffs in
Pollution Case, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com
/bw/articles/2014-03-18/chevron-sues-an-online-poker-magnate-who-backed-plaintiffs-inpollution-case [http://perma.cc/L3P4-ZXU9] (“If DeLeon is ultimately held liable for
significant damages, his fate could inhibit other investors from backing advocacy-oriented
documentaries expressing anti-corporate views.”).
34. See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text; see also Chevron Corp. v. Salazar,
No. 11–0691(LAK), 2011 WL 7112979, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011) (finding some of
Chevron’s discovery practices as “at least in part, meant to harass” and therefore
sanctionable). In the United States alone, Chevron employs five-hundred lawyers from
thirty-six different law firms to litigate the CED. See Chevron Corporation's Appendix to
Its Privilege Logs in Response to Defendants Hugo Gerardo Camacho Naranjo's and
Javier Piagueje Payaguaje's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents and
Things, First Set of Interrogatories (as Revised), and First Set of Requests for Admission,
Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, No. 11–3718–LAK, 2011 WL 3628843, at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
17,
2011), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-08-31-declaration-chevron-lawyers
.pdf [http://perma.cc/4M3W-PNGV]; see also Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note
32, at 9 n.6 (“Under the supervision of Judge Kaplan and his former law partner-turnedSpecial Master, the deposition of Mr. Donziger has turned into a likely record-breaking
fourteen-day Chevron free-for-all.”).
35. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 482–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(RICO decision) (noting the Ecuadorian government’s economic interest in the CED).
36. See Boutrous, supra note 3, at 228.
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unavailability of a forum that can and will generate enforceable
judgments, the consequent global injustice, the tremendously high
cost of transnational litigation, and the inefficiencies created,
specifically, due to the multiplicity of domestic and foreign fora that
hear different aspects of transnational cases.
C.

Corruption: The Concept and Its Prevalence

In order to give an account of what leads to corrupt adjudication
and what can be done to prevent it, we must have a firm idea in mind
of what corruption is—a subject about which there is copious
debate.37 In prior work, one of us has given a general account of the
concept of corruption according to which it is a violation of the rule of
law that appears in two forms.38 Some kinds of corruption appear in
the form of what might be called “tainting,” where an individual or
institution becomes corrupted by an external influence that disrupts
that individual or institution’s decision-making process, distorting it
from its untainted form.39 In the judicial context, a court might be
tainted if it is subject to political or economic influence that turns its
decisions away from the unbiased fidelity to law that it is expected to
have—for example, if the military forces of other branches of
government intimidate judges, those who appoint or have the power
to fire judges politicize the court, or judicial election campaigns lead
judges to make commitments inconsistent with their duties to the law.
The second form of corruption is “disloyalty,” which is a
generalization of the classic practice of bribe-taking to cover those
cases where an individual sells his or her loyalty (or an institution
permits such sale) to some third party, rather than directing it at those
to whom loyalty is owed.40
Both forms of corruption concern us. Our running case study
illustrates the way that they relate to one another: under one
interpretation of the CED, the plaintiffs were moved to bribe the
court (to carry out disloyalty corruption) by the perception that the
court was already tainted by unreasonable influence from the oil
industry, which rendered it unable to deliver a fair judgment on the
merits.41 On that interpretation, the two kinds of corruption were
continuous, rather than discrete: the first kind led to the second.
37. See generally Gowder, supra note 17 (describing the debate about the concept of
corruption and offering a general theory of it).
38. Id. at 86–87.
39. Id. at 86–87, 94.
40. Id. at 87–91, 94–96.
41. See infra Section II.B.
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Accordingly, it would be problematic to treat them as unconnected
phenomena or offer an analysis of potential solutions to one without
addressing the other. However, this picture is complicated by the fact
that tainting-corruption is difficult to identify. To say that a decisionmaker is tainting-corrupt is to say that it is subject to a pervasive,
improper external influence.42 But it follows that to identify a
decision-maker as tainting-corrupt presupposes an identification of
the proper influences on its decisions.43 Such identifications will often
be controversial. For example, suppose a state experiences a socialist
uprising that sets up People’s Courts to reallocate land. An external
corporate litigant would be expected to argue that such courts are
corrupted by their political origins and are for that reason unable to
come to a fair decision; a local peasant would be expected to argue
that the courts are uncorrupted, because they ought to be influenced
by the ideals of the revolution. It would require a complete theory of
judicial legitimacy to correctly identify all cases of tainting-corruption,
even for a commentator who knew all of the relevant facts in any
given case.
To avoid these problems, our analysis is in the first instance
limited to instances of corruption that are carried out by the positive
action of a party leading to a discrete piece of litigation (including
actions in response to requests by a decision-maker, such as the
solicitation of a bribe). On our model, some party must do something
to invoke the corruption of a decision-maker; mere background
corruption will not suffice. (We will call all such actions “corrupting
acts.”) Thus, our model covers all cases of bribery (since bribery
requires someone to pay the bribe), as well as kinds of taintingcorruption in which a party actively does something to invoke the
corruption of a tainted decision-maker in that party’s behavior. For
example, our model covers situations where a friend of a military
regime calls upon her cronies in that regime to pressure its courts,
when a litigant seeks to transfer litigation from a neutral forum into
one biased by a corrupting influence in its favor, or when one seeks to
have a favorable act passed in the legislature to influence the outcome

42. Gowder, supra note 17, at 93–94 (discussing Lessig’s notion of improper
dependence).
43. To anticipate an objection, it is sensible to speak of institutional or collective
decision-makers as well as individual decision-makers as having agency of their own. See
generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY,
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011) (defending notions of collective
agency).
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of the litigation.44 While this limitation does not completely insulate
us from controversies about what sorts of influences count as
corrupting, it does limit their impact: we make no attempt to identify
or address corruption that is constituted merely by background bias in
some party’s behavior.
However, when considering solutions to the problem of litigation
corruption, there will be reason to favor those that can ameliorate not
only party-initiated corruption, but also background corruption
presented in the form of tainting and its resulting bias. Accordingly,
we will defend solutions that in the first instance promote neutrality
between litigants in general.
Corruption is widely perceived to be a worldwide problem.
According to the 2013 “Corruption Perceptions Index” by
Transparency International, a global anticorruption NGO and the
leading source of corruption data, two-thirds of 177 nations studied
score below 50 on a 100-point scale of perceived corruption.45 In 2007,
Transparency International produced a report focusing solely on
judicial corruption.46 Among the findings recounted in that report, the
following, based on a 2006 survey of almost 60,000 respondents in 62
countries, are particularly striking: first, “[o]f the 8,263 people who
had been in contact with the judicial system recently, 991, more than
one in 10, had paid a bribe”; second, “[i]n 33 of the 62 countries
polled, a majority of respondents described the judiciary/legal system
of their country as corrupt”; and third, “[i]n 35 countries, respondents
singled out judges (from a list that also included: police, prosecutor,
lawyer, court staff, witness/jury and ‘other’) as the actors they most
needed to bribe to obtain a ‘fair’ judgment.”47
44. In the CED, one interpretation of events is that Chevron removed the litigation to
Ecuador in the belief that it would benefit from courts corrupted by the military regime’s
dependence on oil interests. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. We assume, for the
purposes of our case study, that the plaintiffs believed as much. As will be seen, our model
depends on the parties’ beliefs about corruption and the incentives therefor, not on the
extent of actual corruption with which any given party is confronted.
45. For a description of results, see Corruption Perceptions Index 2013,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results [http://perma.cc/667M
-G7TY]. Transparency International describes its methods and sources online at
Corruption Perceptions Index: In Detail, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency
.org/cpi2013/in_detail [http://perma.cc/VJM3-U7FF].
46. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION
IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, at xvi (2007), http://files.transparency.org/content/download/173
/695/file/2007_GCR_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/PU4N-SRKB]. Transparency International’s
definition of judicial corruption focuses on political pressure and bribery, categories that
are roughly equivalent to our own. See id. at xxiii–xxiv.
47. Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption Within the Judiciary: Causes and Remedies, in
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 46, at 3, 12.
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The World Justice Project is an international rule of law NGO
that combines data from expert and general population surveys about
a variety of factors relating to the rule of law.48 We have reviewed its
2014 data relating to subfactor 2.2: scores on the proposition
“[g]overnment officials in the judicial branch do not use public office
for private gain.”49 The countries with scores that are more than one
standard deviation below the mean are Afghanistan, Albania,
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Myanmar, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
Ecuador’s score is 0.35, almost one standard deviation below the
mean.50
Figure 1. Distribution of World Justice Project Judicial
Corruption Scores

The real-world consequences of the pattern these data
demonstrate for transnational litigation can best be seen through a
few prominent examples. Another high-profile transnational case that
exhibits features like the CED is the Dole/Dow litigation that was
48. The World Justice Project summarizes its methods online at Methodology,
WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/methodology [http://perma.cc
/8DCU-YTU9].
49. Absence of Corruption, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org
/factors/absence-of-corruption [http://perma.cc/GMM3-NHRP].
50. Chart produced by the undersigned using Microsoft Excel, from World Justice
Project raw data, made available at http://data.worldjusticeproject.org and based on
ninety-nine countries for which data was reported. Mean = 0.55, standard deviation = 0.22
(our calculation).
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subject to a recognition and enforcement action in Osorio v. Dow
Chemical Co.51 In the Dole/Dow litigation, some 10,000 Nicaraguan
plaintiffs secured a total of more than $2 billion in a series of more
than 200 lawsuits filed against Dole Food Company in Nicaraguan
courts.52
In one of the tentacles of the Dole/Dow litigation, the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida held that a judgment of
over $97 million awarded to 150 Nicaraguan agricultural workers was
unenforceable under Florida’s Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign
Money-Judgments
Recognition
Act.53
The
grounds
for
nonenforcement were, inter alia, that the judgment was rendered
under a system that does not provide procedures compatible with the
American requirements of due process of law; that recognition would
be repugnant to Florida’s public policy; and that the judgment “was
rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals.”54 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision in part but declined “to address the broader issue of whether
Nicaragua as a whole ‘does not provide impartial tribunals’ and
decline[d] to adopt the district court’s holding on that question.”55
Other well-known examples of abusive transnational litigation56
or of access to justice and rule of law deficits created by the absence
of jurisdictions capable of granting enforceable judgments57 are
Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank58 and Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi.59
51. 635 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011). The Dole/Dow litigation consists of two
interrelated cases in which Nicaraguan workers sought compensation for harms caused by
exposure to chemicals supplied by Dow and used by Dole. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co.,
665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311–14 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co.,
635 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011); Franco v. Dow Chem. Co., No. CV 03-5094 NM, 2003 WL
24288299, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2003).
52. WILLIAM E. THOMSON & PERLETTE MICHÈLE JURA, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LITIGATION REFORM, CONFRONTING THE NEW BREED OF TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION: ABUSIVE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 3 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter CHAMBER’S
REPORT], http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TransnationalLitigation
_AbusiveForeignJudgments.pdf [http:// perma.cc/3SPJ-M526]. The Chamber’s Report was
authored by counsel for Dole in the Osorio case (discussed below).
53. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (applying FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.601–607 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. & Spec. A Sess.)).
54. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.
55. Id.
56. CHAMBER’S REPORT, supra note 52, at 5.
57. “Remarkably, courts . . . refuse to determine whether the foreign courts afforded
the individual litigants due process, relying instead on political ‘evidence’ and judges’ own
personal perceptions of the foreign countries.” Montré D. Carodine, Political Judging:
When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2007).
58. 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
59. 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995).
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In Bridgeway, the Second Circuit upheld the District Court for
the Southern District of New York’s (“District Court”) refusal to
enforce a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Liberia based
on a determination that the Liberian courts did not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with due process.60 Remarkably,
the Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s summary judgment
even though it was granted sua sponte, without prior notice to the
Liberian plaintiff-appellant, and based on a finding that as a matter of
law Liberian courts did not constitute a functioning judicial system.61
In Pahlavi, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court for the
Central District of California’s summary judgment in favor of the
sister of the former Shah of Iran, Ms. Pahlavi, in an action brought
against her by Iranian banks seeking to enforce default judgments
obtained against her in Iranian courts.62 The district court found, and
the Ninth Circuit upheld, that Ms. Pahlavi could not have had due
process in Iran during the period that the judgments in question were
obtained against her.63 In other words, here, again, the finding was not
that due process was in fact denied, but rather that it categorically

60. Bridgeway Corp., 201 F.3d at 137. Citibank had liquidated its business in Liberia
due to the civil war that then engulfed the state. Id. at 138. Bridgeway, a Liberian
corporation, had a balance of $189,375.66 with the liquidated Citibank branch in
Monrovia, Liberia. Id. The fact that these funds were owed by Citibank to Bridgeway was
not in dispute. Rather, Citibank defended itself by challenging the legitimacy of the
Liberian judicial system. Id. at 139. The District Court rejected a claim that Citibank was
judicially estopped from questioning the fairness of the Liberian judiciary having
voluntarily litigated before it. Id. at 141. Specifically, it rejected a judicial estoppel claim
based on the fact that “Citibank has taken part in at least a dozen civil cases in Liberia
[during the relevant timeframe] . . . [a]nd in several of those cases, Citibank appeared as a
plaintiff.” Id. The District Court based its summary judgment on U.S. State Department
Country Reports for Liberia finding that during the relevant period “corruption and
incompetent handling of cases remained a recurrent problem” and that “the judicial
system, already hampered by inefficiency and corruption, collapsed for six months
following the outbreak of fighting.” Id. at 138. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that
Citibank met both the burden of production and persuasion in presenting the
uncontradicted U.S. State Department documents that “describ[ed] the chaos within the
Liberian judicial system during the period of interest . . . [and] indicate[d] that the Liberian
judicial system was in a state of disarray.” Id. at 142 (i.e., the decisions were not based on a
finding of judicial corruption in the litigation at bar).
61. The Second Circuit stated that this generally “discouraged practice” of law. Id. at
139. Summarily dismissing sua sponte without notice did not procedurally prejudice
Bridgeway because Bridgeway itself brought a motion for summary judgment and in its
memorandum of law argued that the evidence it submitted was sufficient to establish that
the Liberian courts constituted a “system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice.” Id.
62. Bank Melli Iran, 58 F.3d at 1411.
63. Id. at 1413.
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could not have been provided in the legal system in question.64 Here,
too, the courts relied on consular information sheets and other
reports issued by the State Department.65 Some of those reported on
the Iranian judicial system (while others reported on matters such as
terrorism), and they concluded that in Iran “trials are rarely held in
public, that they are highly politicized, and that the regime does not
believe in the independence of the judiciary.”66 Finally, here, too, the
court declined to judicially estop a party who had previously argued
that the case should be dismissed on FNC grounds because Iran
would be the proper place for trial.67
In sum, a review of the doctrine reveals that U.S.-based
multinational corporations and much of the American judiciary
perceive the judicial systems of much of the world as corrupt to such a
degree that it is unnecessary to examine whether any form of
corruption actually occurred in any given case. The doctrine also
reveals that these perceptions match those of high-profile
international NGOs and those who respond to their surveys.
We now turn to Part I, in which we develop a general model that
describes the strategic incentives facing many transnational litigants.
I. THE TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION PRISONER’S DILEMMA
The prisoner’s dilemma is the classic paradox of game theory. In
its most traditional form, the game imagines a pair of players who
have a choice: to cooperate with one another, or to defect from a
mutually beneficial agreement. The catch is that mutual cooperation
is better for each than mutual defection, but that defection is better
for a single player than cooperation, regardless of what the other
player does.68 This last feature is called, in game-theoretic lingo, a
64. Id. at 1411.
65. Id. at 1413.
66. Id. at 1412.
67. Id. at 1413. In view of the frequent appearance of this pattern of behavior—insist
that a suit initially filed in the United States be refiled in a foreign court, and then
challenge the foreign court’s judgment on due process grounds—it seems plausible to
suppose that defendants are either (a) looking down the game tree and anticipating that
subsequent judgments will be unenforceable, or (b) strategically attempting to increase
plaintiffs’ litigation costs. This, in turn, suggests that reform of FNC standards, and other
doctrines that currently bar access to U.S. courts, may be a part of any structural solution
to the transnational litigation problem. See generally, e.g., Whytock & Robertson, supra
note 27 (proposing solutions at both the FNC stage and judgement-enforcement stage of
litigation). However, as discussed at supra note 8, the contemporary jurisprudential
currents and those of the past generation point the opposite direction, making this solution
unrealistic. Thus, a solution is unlikely to emerge from the American judiciary.
68. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1391–92 (describing a prisoner’s dilemma).
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“strictly dominant strategy.” We have characterized the prisoner’s
dilemma formally in the Appendix.69
The problem from the perspective of parties in corrupt litigation
is best captured by an old joke about the crooked judge. As we have
heard it told, a judge is wrestling with the following dilemma: having
received $5,000 from the plaintiff and $10,000 from the defendant,
what ruling should be made? The judge comes to the following plan:
give $5,000 back to the defendant, and decide the case on the merits.
In that joke, the judge makes out like a bandit, but the parties are the
butts: even having paid a bribe, neither gets any benefit. Each has
flushed five grand down the toilet. But if you are a party before such a
judge, what else do you do? Let the other side be the only briber? In
the subsections that follow, we propose to demonstrate that this joke
is a model for the real world of transnational litigation.
A. The Corrupt Litigation Game as a Prisoner’s Dilemma
1. Corrupt Trial Courts
The situation of litigants facing a corruptible court can helpfully
be understood as a prisoner’s dilemma.70 Each litigant may choose to
litigate honestly (cooperate) or carry out a corrupting act (including,
but not limited to, paying a bribe) (defect). If a litigant corrupts the
court, the court is, ex hypothesi, more likely to rule in that litigant’s
favor. Accordingly, if one’s opponent is not corrupting the court, one
has reason to corrupt the court at any cost less than the expected
value of the additional chance of victory the corrupting act confers.
Similarly, if one’s opponent is corrupting the court, offering one’s
own corrupting act may “balance the scales” and will be worth doing
to the extent sufficient probability of victory can thereby be
recovered.
In the Appendix, we have formally described the situation in
which corruption of a court constitutes a prisoner’s dilemma.
Generally, such situations will arise when both parties can relatively
cheaply corrupt the court, and when the expected value of corruption
will be high either because there is a large amount in dispute or
because corruption is particularly likely to lead to victory. In such a
situation, the litigants will prefer mutual honesty to mutual
69. See infra Appendix.
70. A corruptible court, in this analysis, is a court in which there is at least one
corrupting act available to a party, where that act has an expected value in terms of its
effect on the outcome that is higher than its cost to the party (the cost of a bribe, the risk
of getting caught, etc.).
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corruption, but the conjunction of their strictly dominant strategies
will lead them to, e.g., pay bribes and waste their money all while
imposing the negative externalities caused by supporting a corrupt
legal system.71
Importantly, in light of the problem of corruption in the
developing world as well as in the specific context of the CED, the
prisoner’s dilemma is built by perceptions. Players’ behavior will be
driven by their expected returns on bribery, not by the extent to
which courts actually are corrupt (or predisposed to bribe-taking).
Accordingly, nothing in our argument depends on accepting a claim
that many foreign courts are, in fact, corrupt or corruptible72—a claim
which may, but need not, be based on accurate conceptions of foreign
courts (it could also be based on, e.g., cultural bias).73
We thus interpret transnational litigation, as illustrated by the
CED, as a matter of self-fulfilling perceptions. Both Chevron and the
plaintiffs saw the Ecuadorian courts as corrupted by the interests of
the opposing parties. Accordingly, both felt the need to intervene to
attempt to corrupt the courts further, but their behavior need not
have been based in the first place on accurate conceptions of the
corruption of the courts.
2. What About Appeals?
An appeal functions as a second round of play between the
parties but involves a new institution, the appellate court, which may
or may not itself be corruptible. Enforcement actions and parallel
proceedings, such as the BIT arbitrations at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (“PCA”), that are taking place in the CED are, for our
purposes, similar to appeals since they provide another round at a
new institution. These proceedings are therefore captured by the
analysis above. (By “round,” here we mean the term as used by game
theorists, i.e., an opportunity to play the game again. In both appeals
and enforcement actions the litigants are again asked to make a
decision about whether or not to attempt to corrupt the court, in light
of the underlying strategic dynamics they face.)

71. See supra text accompanying notes 10–27 (rule of law discussion).
72. As is the view of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See CHAMBER’S REPORT,
supra note 52, at 6.
73. What may appear as a failure of due process may simply be a reflection of
differences in legal traditions. See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
179, 181–82 (2004) (criticizing American legal scholars for disregard of unfamiliar foreign
legal systems, using the example of scholarly denial that China has a legal system).
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In the model of this Article, the availability of appeals does not
fundamentally change the strategic dynamics of the situation. So long
as there is a finite upper limit on the number of rounds that may be
played, whether or not a prisoner’s dilemma is iterated (i.e., has
multiple rounds) makes no difference: the sole equilibrium over the
multiple-round game, as over the single-round game, remains mutual
defection.74
Even if subsequent fora are not corrupt (or are mixed between
corrupt and noncorrupt fora), the basic logic of the model still holds.
The key assumption is that the outcomes of fora in transnational
litigation are linked, such that the bribery of a corrupt forum can
influence the outcome of a subsequent noncorrupt forum. This
assumption will ordinarily be satisfied for the simple reason that
corruption is a matter of dispute: the party who procures a corrupt
judgment can be expected to deny having done so in a subsequent
forum, and so long as there is some nonzero probability that his or
her denial will be believed, principles of comity, full faith and credit,
deference, and the like will lead the subsequent court to weight its
evaluation in favor of the result reached by the prior judgment. Thus,
in the enforcement context (i.e., where the jurisdiction in which a
defendant’s assets are located is different from the jurisdiction in
which an alleged tort is committed), subsequent courts must
ordinarily rely on the judgment and factual basis thereof established
in the prior court.75 Similarly, in the appellate context, where
appellate tribunals must rely to some extent on initial (and potentially
corruptible) findings in a trial court,76 the disparate information held
by parties and initial fora relative to subsequent fora all but
guarantees some amount of de facto deference, even in the absence of
de jure rules requiring it.
In short, appeals or enforcement actions may change the payoffs,
but not the basic strategic structure. So long as a bribe in the first

74. John W. Carroll, Indefinite Terminating Points and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
22 THEORY & DECISION 247, 248–50 (1987). This is not true of an indefinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma with no maximum number of rounds, which can support cooperative
equilibria just as can an infinitely repeated version. See Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ (last
updated Aug. 29, 2014) [http://perma.cc/WFB7-FGGE (dark archive)].
75. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(d)
(NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2005) (imposing the burden of
proof for establishing a specific ground for nonrecognition upon the party raising it).
76. Thus, in U.S. law, every standard of review shy of de novo represents a
dependency between the appellate tribunal and the lower tribunal, such that influencing a
result in the latter shifts probability mass toward one’s preferred result in the former.
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forum makes it more likely that the ultimate decision in subsequent
fora will go in a litigant’s favor, for sufficiently cheap bribes and
sufficiently high stakes in the dispute, each litigant will still prefer to
bribe the first forum, even when subsequent fora are incorruptible. A
cheap shot at a corruptly procured judgment that might be enforced
later in a noncorrupt forum may easily be better, from the standpoint
of a litigant contemplating a bribe, than litigating fairly in the
noncorrupt forum in the first place. We demonstrate this claim
formally in the Appendix.77
3. Does the Prisoner’s Dilemma Really Capture the Problem?
The use of prisoner’s dilemma models in the legal literature has
been subject to some criticism.78 It has been suggested that legal
scholars use prisoner’s dilemma models because they are easy: they
generate a unique equilibrium (in one-shot and finitely repeated
play), and are readily amenable to a standard toolkit of solutions
(e.g., force the players to cooperate).79 But ease of use is not the same
thing as appropriateness, and legal scholars who are insufficiently
versed in less popular models may choose the prisoner’s dilemma
even though it poorly describes the phenomenon under study.
However, the prisoner’s dilemma is a powerful tool independent
of its relative tractability because it describes a human universal: the
temptation to cheat on mutually beneficial social orders.80
Unsurprisingly, wherever we find mutually beneficial social orders,
we find scholars deploying prisoner’s dilemma models. For example,
the first generation of formal international relations literature was
dominated by prisoner’s dilemma models.81 This ought to be
unsurprising, since agreements between states such as peace treaties,
arms control agreements, and trade agreements obviously have the
high-level features of a prisoner’s dilemma. Consider an arms control
agreement between two parties: it is often beneficial for both parties
to have both disarm; it is even more beneficial to hold on to one’s

77. See infra Appendix C.
78. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 210–13 (2009) (recounting criticisms of
the prisoner’s dilemma and levying his own).
79. See id. at 212.
80. See Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6,
6 (1986) (describing the “essence of the Prisoner’s Dilemma” as “an incentive to induce
others to cooperate and to defect from the joint strategy in the hope of enjoying the fruits
of cooperation without incurring the opportunity costs of compliance”).
81. Michael J. Gilligan & Leslie Johns, Formal Models of International Institutions, 15
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 221, 222 (2012).
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arms while the other side disarms (and even more so if one expects
that the other side will cheat and remain armed).
It is for this reason that international relations scholar and
leading game theorist James Fearon argued that the prisoner’s
dilemma is a part of a general strategic structure common to most
international relations scenarios.82 Fearon’s structure works as
follows: first, we should understand the players as participating in a
coordination game by which they settle on one of the potentially
many mutually beneficial agreements; second, we should understand
them as participating in a prisoner’s dilemma to determine the extent
to which they can comply.83 Fearon’s insight has special relevance to
the use of prisoner’s dilemma models in legal contexts. Some legal
contexts involve players who have the opportunity to shape the rules
that apply to them (e.g., legislators or contracting parties), and thus as
to whom the coordination stage of Fearon’s two-stage analytic
structure is relevant. However, often the existing rules of the game,
establishing a mutually beneficial set of social rules, will be set
exogenously in advance (e.g., the applicable tort law), and the only
question relevant for a given analysis will be the extent to which the
players can be induced to follow the established rules. For example,
the enforcement of property rights can easily be understood as an nplayer prisoner’s dilemma: the existence of a system of private
property is ex hypothesi beneficial for each of us, but it would be even
better for me, personally (and each one of us as an individual), if
everyone else obeyed my property rights, but I got to steal. Thus, we
have police and jails to make defection costlier than cooperation.
In the instant context, the prisoner’s dilemma is the right choice
as an initial modeling tool for the same reasons. The situations we are
concerned about are those in which the preexisting and mutually
beneficial rules of fair and honest litigation are subject to profitable
defection.84 Judicial corruption is the classic example of such a
82. James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation, 52
INT’L ORG. 269, 270, 276 (1998).
83. Id. at 277–79.
84. Why mutually beneficial? We operate under the assumption that litigants in
general, including parties in litigation like the CED, would prefer to fight out their
disputes in legal orders characterized by determinate and fair systems of judicial resolution
because those systems, inter alia, allow them, from a short-term perspective, to avoid the
costs of extra-legal dispute resolution (i.e., violence or the recruitment of others to carry
out violence) and uncertainty about the consequences of a particular dispute, and, from a
long-term perspective, to benefit from things like enforceable contracts. See Anna
Persson, Bo Rothstein & Jan Teorell, Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic
Corruption as a Collective Action Problem, 26 GOVERNANCE 449, 456–63 (2013)
(presenting evidence from Kenya and Uganda consistent with a collective-action
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situation: the players facing a corruptible court may choose either to
play by the mutually beneficial rules of litigation or defect by
corrupting a judge.85
B.

What Things Solve Prisoner’s Dilemmas?

The key insight that prisoner’s dilemma analysis offers for the
problem of judicial corruption is that the parties do not want to be
there. From the standpoint of each litigant, if they do not have
incentives to act corruptly, they can avoid wasting resources on
corruption.86 Attending to the strategic structure of the corrupt
litigation game will shed light on policy options that may be missed
without the formal analysis.
The conventional regulatory solutions currently tend to be only
directed at bribery (disloyalty corruption), not the much harder to
regulate tainting-corruption which is—as the CED demonstrates—
closely linked to it. For that reason, most regulatory solutions are
understanding of corruption on the official level, similar to the model this Article presents
at the litigant level: actual political actors see themselves as having an incentive to act
corruptly because of the corrupt actions of others).
85. It may be objected that players may spend more or less on corruption, and may do
so through multiple rounds. For example, plaintiff may pay one bribe, then defendant may
pay a larger bribe, then plaintiff may outbid defendant, and so on. Such a game would not
be a prisoner’s dilemma, but an auction. However, it would have the key features of a
prisoner’s dilemma: the players would get their money sucked away, and would prefer, but
be unable to reach, an equilibrium in which they did not bribe at all. See Michael R. Baye,
Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information, 8
ECON. THEORY 291, 292 (1996). In effect, such a symmetric auction (where players value
the good at the same amount) is just a prisoner’s dilemma in slightly fancier terms: each
bidder would prefer that nobody bid at all, but given that player X is bidding any amount
N less than the total value V of the auctioned good (judgment), including N = 0, player Y
has an incentive to bid N + some positive amount ε where N + ε < V, at which point
player X has an incentive to bid N + ε + ε , and so forth, wasting the resources of both
because they are unable to cooperate. This may not hold for cases where the parties value
the outcome of litigation differently (e.g., because more than money is at stake for one
party). See generally Gadi Fibich & Gal Oren, An Elementary Proof of the Common
Maximal Bid in Asymmetric First-Price and All-Pay Auctions, 122 ECON. LETTERS 190
(2014) (proving that no bidder bids more than the lowest maximum bid in such
asymmetric auctions). In general, auction theory gets very complicated once we leave the
symmetric case, and our results may not apply to all such cases. However, we are
concerned primarily with litigation in which the parties primarily care about the money at
stake, and, for that reason, have symmetrical payoffs. When other values are at stake, we
would expect the parties to sometimes reach a Coasean bargain. For example, where one
party is particularly concerned about the reputational cost of losing litigation, we often see
settlements paired with confidentiality agreements.
86. In effect, litigants become free to choose honest litigation only when they have the
option of corrupting the court taken away from them. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000)
(describing how agents may benefit from the option to bind themselves).
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flawed from the start. However, we describe them to give the reader a
sense of the contemporary context and the flaws in current strategies,
even in terms of their limited goals.
The first conventional regulatory solution to bribery is to impose
criminal punishments on the activity.87 In strategic terms, this is an
attempt to directly increase the costs of corruption, hopefully to the
point that it is larger than the expected value of biasing the judge in
one’s favor. However, when we observe bribery despite criminal
punishment, we can conclude that this strategy has failed at least in
part.88
A second conventional regulatory solution to bribery is to
control the corruptibility of judges by subjecting them to criminal
prosecution. In strategic terms, this is an attempt to indirectly
increase the costs of corruption to the parties by causing judges to
demand more money to compensate for the increased risk of
punishment. However, this strategy is also ineffective in some
contexts, particularly in the international context, where the state
with criminal jurisdiction over the judge (e.g., Ecuador) may be
different from the state that wants to prevent the bribery, or from any
state that has the enforcement capacity to detect and prosecute it.89
Since these conventional solutions are imperfect, the prisoner’s
dilemma model allows us to see a number of alternatives that may be
available. These include the following:
1. Facilitating Enforceable Side-Bargains
Imagine the following simple prisoner’s dilemma, where (by
convention) the player who chooses the columns gets the payoffs
listed first:

87. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)
(imposing criminal penalties for bribery of foreign officials).
88. Failure might occur (a) because bribery is prohibitively costly for the government
to prosecute (including not just where there are problems of detection or proof, but also
where governments with jurisdiction have conflicting interests, such as in permitting their
own nationals to use bribery to obtain a competitive advantage or where the relevant
officials would like to profit from bribes themselves), or (b) because the magnitude of
punishment necessary to deter is so high given the magnitude of the goods at stake that
imposing a punishment of sufficient size would lead to other policy costs (such as political
opposition, costs associated with the destruction of bribing companies, chilling effects in
which companies refrain from lawful behavior for fear of prosecution, etc.).
89. For more on why anticorruption measures are only likely to be enforced
transnationally if their adjudication is internationalized, see infra notes 248–58 and
accompanying text.
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Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

$10,000; $10,000

$10,001; $0

Defect

$0; $10,001

$1; $1
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This is a truly horrible prisoner’s dilemma. The parties destroy
almost all of their utility by following their (strictly dominant)
defection strategies. However, suppose each could make an
enforceable agreement with the other: “I will pay you fifty dollars for
not defecting.” This changes the game as follows:
Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

$10,000; $10,000

$9,951; $50

Defect

$50; $9,951

$1; $1

Here, the prisoner’s dilemma has been eliminated because
defection is no longer a strictly dominant strategy. This translates, in
terms of the corrupt litigation game, into a side-agreement between
the parties according to which they mutually increase the costs of
corrupt acts. Theoretically, they might implement such an agreement
by, for example, voluntarily creating an incorruptible independent
monitor for their litigation and giving that monitor the power to
impose large financial penalties on any litigant caught paying a bribe.
Policymakers could, in principle, facilitate such transactions by
providing the legal tools to permit such monitors, e.g., by giving
monitors powers such as liens and access to (noncorrupt) courts to
enforce their punishments, or by requiring their use. Essentially, this
would amount to imposing the costs of enforcing national antibribery
law on the parties rather than on the legal system.
However, this solution is unrealistic in the present context. As
the CED has demonstrated, monitors too can be corrupted.90
Accordingly, implementing this solution in practical contexts would
require the creation of substantial infrastructure to protect against

90. See discussion infra notes 179–93 (describing corruption of an ostensibly
independent monitor in the CED).

94 N.C. L. REV. 751 (2016)

776

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

corrupting such monitors but without the enforceability advantages of
the international courts discussed below. Thus, we mention this
option for analytical completeness only.
2. Facilitating Repeated Play
It is well known among game theorists that cooperation can
sometimes be sustained in an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, given sufficiently low discounting of the future.91 Typically,
this works because, in repeated play, the players may adopt a variety
of conditional retaliation strategies: for example, the well-known
mutual “grim trigger” strategy amounts to each player telling the
other “I’ll cooperate now, but if you defect in this round, I will defect
forever, and we will both end up with the lousy payoffs for mutual
defection.”92
In the litigation context, this suggests that it will sometimes be
possible for parties who anticipate future dealings to avoid the mutual
bribery outcome by creating these kinds of self-enforcing strategies.
Policymakers, for their part, can encourage this by encouraging
parties to structure their deals in a fashion that permits long-run
play.93
More concretely, we might organize individuals who find
themselves in transnational bargaining (or litigation) with
international corporations into aggregate entities, such as labor
unions, consumers’ unions, special-purpose municipal corporations,
and the like, in order to facilitate long-run interaction and extend the
time-horizons of the parties. For example, major deals can be
conducted between parties organized as indefinitely lived corporate
entities, which may anticipate future play more readily than finitely
lived individuals.
91. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with
Discounting and with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533, 533 (1986). By
contrast, finitely repeated play will not work. For any determinate N rounds of a prisoner’s
dilemma, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is mutual defection at every round. Id. at
534.
92. See Fiona McGillivray & Alastair Smith, Trust and Cooperation Through AgentSpecific Punishments, 54 INT’L ORG. 809, 814–15 (2000) (explaining grim trigger
strategies).
93. In general, economists are beginning to recognize the importance of creating
indefinitely lived parties to solve systemic commitment problems of all types. See, e.g.,
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE AND
SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED
HUMAN HISTORY 46, 158–69, 242–43, 262–63, 267 (2009) (detailing the development of
indefinitely lived organizations in economic history and its role in solving numerous kinds
of commitment problems).
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Again, this option seems somewhat nonviable in the present
world. It would require extensive changes to the local legal regimes
for handling FDI in recipient countries, not all of which could be
expected to cooperate with such a program. Accordingly, we leave
this prospect aside as well, potentially to be further explored in future
work.
3. Creation of a Noncorrupt Tribunal
A player that looks down the game tree and sees that it will find
itself in a mutual-defection situation may choose the mutualcooperation payoff before entering into litigation, or regulators may
choose such a forum for parties.94 This may be done before the onset
of a controversy, as with arbitration agreements written into an
original contract where the designated arbitrator is not corruptible.95
It may also be done after the onset of a controversy, but before the
onset of litigation, as when a plaintiff may only choose noncorrupt
fora (for example, there may be mandatory jurisdiction in a
noncorrupt international court). It might even be done after the onset
of litigation by forum-selection rules that permit defendants to move
the case to a less corrupt forum.96
The effectiveness of those institutional modifications that depend
on ex ante party choice, like arbitration agreements, depends on the
assumption that each player prefers mutual honesty to mutual
corruption and can anticipate that unilateral corruption is impossible
(“if I bribe, I know you will bribe, too”). Under these circumstances,
each player will want to bind its own hands and make it impossible for
either player to pay a bribe. The effectiveness of the modifications
that take the choice away from the parties depends on the willingness
94. In order to solve the prisoner’s dilemma, the parties must not be able to choose a
corrupt forum at the time of litigation (their hands must be tied). However, they may be
able to choose between a corrupt and a noncorrupt forum before a dispute arises so long
as when there is a dispute they have made the correct choice ex ante.
95. Critiques of the international system, with its repeat-play private contractorarbitrators, may render arbitration a problematic solution. See discussion infra notes 215–
28. At any rate, this discussion is academic since tort cases cannot be resolved in
arbitration as a matter of public policy.
96. Interestingly, the U.S. system, which permits defendants to remove some cases to
federal court, may be interpreted in this fashion. In some circumstances, we may suppose
that federal judges are less susceptible to corruption than state judges, e.g., because they
have more to lose when they get caught (thanks to life tenure), because they are subject to
more external scrutiny, because federal prosecutors are particularly aggressive about such
things, etc. In those circumstances, removal may serve as a corruption-preventing
measure. In addition and analogously, one of the (historical) rationales for diversity
jurisdiction was the fear of bias in state courts. STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 272 (3d ed. 2008).
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of states that operate corrupt courts to transfer litigation away from
their own courts to others. Both types of modification also depend on
the availability of some noncorrupt forum, backed by state power,
willing and able to enforce the agreement to litigate before the
optional tribunal. The efficacy of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards97 is an
example of how such enforcement can be achieved. The convention
requires domestic courts to enforce arbitration agreements and is
universally regarded as the most successful convention relating to
commercial law.98 Of course, it is imperative in these circumstances to
avoid creating institutions that permit corruption. To be precise, any
such forum must be perceived as incorruptible, so that the parties
have no reason to try to corrupt it. Here, too, international tribunals,
while often controversial on other grounds, are not generally
criticized for being corrupt.99
A genuinely impartial court may be able to solve bribery
problems that are not akin to a prisoner’s dilemma. Not all corrupt
transnational litigation will have a prisoner’s dilemma structure—a
party with a meritless position may have payoffs so low from honest
litigation that it prefers mutual bribery, which increases costs to all
parties litigating, to fair and efficient adjudication. Allowing the other
party in such a dispute to select a noncorrupt forum either by initial
filing (for plaintiffs) or removal (for defendants) would contribute to
solving even such non-prisoner’s dilemma corruption. This is another
reason we believe that an international court is a potentially
politically viable solution: it benefits both corporate defendants and
plaintiffs with meritorious claims against those with frivolous claims
or defenses who prefer mutual corruption to honest litigation.
Accordingly, below, we argue for the creation of an ICCJ as the
most direct solution to the problem of judicial corruption. Such a
court, because its interests are independent of those of the parties or
of the economy of any particular nation-state, is more likely to be
perceived as incorruptible and will therefore give the parties no
incentive to attempt to actually corrupt it.

97. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
98. BORN, supra note 20, at 20–21.
99. For our discussion on the international best practices for judicial independence
that the ICCJ should adopt (and that international courts and tribunals generally adopt in
one variation or another) to meet the requirement of noncorruptibility, see infra text
accompanying notes 260–74.
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II. “THIS IS ECUADOR”100—THE CAUTIONARY TALE OF THE
CHEVRON-ECUADOR DISPUTE
For reasons described in the Introduction, we use the CED to
illustrate the existence and operation of perceptions of corruption in
transnational litigation.
Given the ongoing nature of the litigation, we wish to explicitly
note that it is not our intention to take sides on any of the issues in
dispute in the Lago Agrio litigation, the RICO litigation, or any of the
other associated proceedings. We are interested, instead, in the
parties’ perceptions of the judicial process and, to the extent
discernable, the litigation strategies that flow from these perceptions.
The interested reader can turn to the extensive media campaigns of
both parties, as well as the extensive court records, and make up his
own mind on the respective merits of the parties’ positions. If
anything, we concur with Professor Burt Neuborne who admonished
both parties: “A plague on both their houses.”101 Indeed, it is the
depressing fact that despite the tremendous stakes—the welfare of
the residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon, the environmental impact
of oil drilling, the ability of multinational corporations to conduct
FDI—neither party wears the white hat in this case that provided the
very impetus for our inquiry as to what went wrong.
A. Background: The Longest-Running Transnational Litigation and
the Largest-Ever Environmental Judgment
As noted above, to date the CED has yielded the largest
judgment ever imposed for environmental contamination by any
court, and the litigation has been ongoing for more than twenty years.
In the words of the Second Circuit, “The story of the conflict between
Chevron and residents of the Lago Agrio region of the Ecuadorian
Amazon must be among the most extensively told in the history of
the American federal judiciary.”102
While the Lago Agrio Judgment has now been upheld by
Ecuador’s highest court, numerous associated and parallel
100. Lead plaintiffs’ attorney, Steven Donziger: “[Y]ou know, this is Ecuador,
okay . . . you can say whatever you want and at the end of the day, there’s a thousand
people around the courthouse, you’re going to get what you want. Sorry, but it’s
true . . . . Because at the end of the day, this is all for the Court just a bunch of smoke and
mirrors and bullshit. It really is.” Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO decision) (discussing an outtake from Crude).
101. Burt Neuborne, A Plague on Both Their Houses: A Modest Proposal for Ending
the Ecuadorean Rainforest Wars, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 509, 510 (2013).
102. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (global injunction
decision).
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proceedings are currently underway globally in connection with the
Judgment. These include: recognition and enforcement actions in
Argentina, Brazil, and Canada,103 with more such actions expected in
some of the other seventy-plus jurisdictions in which Chevron has
assets;104 an international investment arbitration brought by Chevron
against the Republic of Ecuador in the PCA for alleged violations by
Ecuador of a BIT between Ecuador and the United States (“PCA
arbitration”);105 and a civil RICO action brought by Chevron against
Donziger, plaintiffs’ lead counsel, and others in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (“RICO
action”).106
The scope of this ongoing litigation makes it impossible (and
unnecessary) to describe its procedural history in full. Some key
procedural milestones, however, are pivotal to understanding both
the kind of corruption feared ex ante by litigants, as well as the
perceptions of corruption evident in this particular litigation. These
milestones are the FNC proceedings, which commenced in 1993 and
concluded in 2002; the foreign discovery proceedings; the so-called
global injunction against enforcement outside of Ecuador; the PCA
arbitration; the appeals in Ecuador; and the RICO action. These are
described in the following paragraphs. Their significance to the record
regarding perceptions of corruption and actual corruption, as well as
the incentives demonstrated in our formal model, become clear in
Sections II.B through II.E, where we describe the parties’ perceptions
and consequent litigation strategy as evidenced by the records of
these proceedings.
The FNC Proceedings. The CED commenced in 1993 when
Maria Aguinda Salazar and a group of Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed a
class action against Texaco (“Aguinda Litigation”) in the Southern
District of New York advancing claims under the ATCA.107 Chevron
spent the better part of the next nine years seeking the dismissal of
the Aguinda suit on grounds of, amongst others, forum non

103. See Manuel A. Gómez, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and
Enforcement of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG.
429, 430 (2013).
104. Id. at 431 n.10.
105. Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Notice of
Arbitration, at 1 (UNCITRAL Arb. Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Claimants’ Notice of
Arbitration], http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0155_0.pdf [http://
perma.cc/8BS2-PXMK].
106. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 00691(LAK), 2013 WL 1087236, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).
107. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
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conveniens.108 Chevron prevailed, and the case was dismissed.109 The
plaintiffs appealed the ruling, and the Second Circuit reversed on the
ground that the District Court had failed to obtain a commitment by
Texaco to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts.110 The
Second Circuit remanded with instructions to require Texaco’s
consent to Ecuadorian jurisdiction.111 Texaco provided the required
commitment and then renewed its motion to dismiss, which was
granted.112
In 2003, the plaintiffs commenced a new action in Ecuador,
which ultimately resulted in the Lago Agrio Judgment. And while at
the insistence of the Second Circuit, and as a precondition for the
FNC dismissal, Texaco made a commitment to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court,113 on the very first day of the
proceedings in Ecuador, Chevron’s lawyer argued that the
Ecuadorian court did not have jurisdiction to try the case.114
The Foreign Discovery Proceedings. In the process of defending
against the Lago Agrio litigation, Chevron discovered a discrepancy
between two versions of the film Crude—a documentary about the
Lago Agrio litigation produced at Donziger’s invitation and with his
cooperation.115 One version was released in theatres; the other was
available on Netflix.116 The Netflix version contained footage
suggesting that the purportedly neutral court-appointed damages
expert, Richard Cabrera Vega, was in fact working with and for the
plaintiffs.117
Following this discovery, Chevron launched dozens of discovery
proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides for
domestic discovery attendant to foreign litigation throughout the
United States. The Third Circuit characterized the campaign as

108. Id. at 472–74.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 475.
111. Id.
112. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO
decision).
113. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as
modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Texaco has now unambiguously agreed in writing
to being sued on these claims . . . in Ecuador.”).
114. See CBS, 60 Minutes: Amazon Crude, YOUTUBE (May 3, 2009), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=UGG1nIwxNhs (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) [hereinafter 60 Minutes
Interview].
115. See Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 453–54; Barrett, supra note 33.
116. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 453–54; Barrett, supra note 33.
117. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
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“unique in the annals of American judicial history.”118 Two of the
dozens of § 1782 proceedings are particularly noteworthy. First is the
so-called Berlinger § 1782 proceeding, decided by District Court
Judge Kaplan. Judge Kaplan held that the director of the
documentary was not entitled to the qualified evidentiary privilege
for information gathered in a journalistic investigation.119
Consequently, six-hundred hours of outtakes from the documentary
were produced and became publicly available. The hundreds of hours
of footage revealed much of the damaging evidence against Steven
Donziger and formed a significant part of the foundation for the
findings in the RICO litigation. The second proceeding involved a
§ 1782 order by Judge Kaplan that Donziger produce all of his
litigation files.120 These included, among other things, Donziger’s
personal diary, in which he chronicled the litigation and his
perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs relating to it.121
The Global Injunction. As the date of the Lago Agrio Judgment
was approaching, and it was becoming clear that the judgment would
likely be favorable to the plaintiffs, Chevron brought an action under
New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments
Recognition Act122 in the District Court, asking for a global injunction
against the enforcement of such a judgment. Chevron prevailed and
received a preliminary injunction that prohibited plaintiffs from
enforcing or preparing to enforce the forthcoming Ecuadorian
judgment against Chevron anywhere outside of the Republic of
Ecuador.123 The District Court found that since the election of
President Correa in 2006, the Ecuadorian judicial system had become
incapable of producing a judgment enforceable in New York courts.124

118. In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 282 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
119. See In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 293–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011).
120. See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 167–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
121. See Declaration of Kristin L. Hendricks in Support of Chevron Corporation’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit 76, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ.
0691(LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Donziger’s Diary] (composite of Steven
Donziger’s personal notes).
122. New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. §§ 5301–09 (MCKINNEY 2013).
123. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012) (global
injunction decision).
124. Id. at 634–35. It then went on to hold that there was “ample evidence of fraud in
the Ecuadorian proceedings.” Id. at 636. But compare Neuborne’s tongue-in-cheek
comment: “Unlike the United States, where politics simply never affects judicial
nominations or the outcome of litigation, I am shocked to learn that President Correa has
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously
reversed the District Court’s decision, finding its ruling to be a
misapprehension of the law.125 It stated: “The Recognition Act
nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign judgment
unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgmentdebtor.”126 The Second Circuit criticized the factual foundation of the
District Court’s decision in finding that the Ecuadorian judiciary was
categorically incapable of producing an enforceable judgment, noting
that the finding relied heavily on a single declaration by an avowed
political opponent of President Correa.127 Moreover, the Second
Circuit opined that “when a court in one country attempts to preclude
the courts of every other nation from ever considering the effect of
that foreign judgment, the comity concerns become far graver.”128
The Ecuadorian Appeals. Chevron swiftly appealed the
Ecuadorian trial court’s judgment, but its appeal was dismissed by the
court of appeals, the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos. The
court of appeals reaffirmed the judgment below in its entirety,
ordered Chevron to pay court and attorney fees for abuse of process
and “manifest procedural bad faith,” and harshly criticized Judge
Kaplan’s portrayal of the Ecuadorian judicial system.129 Chevron also
filed for extraordinary review before the National Justice Court of
Ecuador. The National Justice Court upheld the judgment sans the
punitive damages, thereby halving the judgment.130
The RICO Action. In the context of the global injunction
proceedings, Judge Kaplan, outraged by the mounting evidence of
improprieties by Donziger and his team, “signaled to Chevron’s
counsel his amenability to potential racketeering charges:”131

been charged with seeking to exercise undue influence over the Ecuadorean judiciary by
asserting the power to appoint friendly judges.” Neuborne, supra note 101, at 509 n.1.
125. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239.
126. Id. at 240.
127. See id. at 238 & n.9.
128. Id. at 244.
129. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 2011-0106, at 13, 15–17 (Provincial Ct. of
Justice of Sucumbíos Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador); see also Gómez, supra note 103, at 443.
130. Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 174-2012, at 222 (Corte Nacional de Justicia Nov.
12, 2013) (Ecuador), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2013-11-12-final-sentence-fromcnj-de-ecuador-spanish.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GWC-JD28].
131. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 32, at 4. It is the plaintiffs’ team’s view
that “[o]ne district court judge used the soap box of a limited discovery proceeding to
usurp the role of the Ecuadorian court and pass judgment on the merits of the underlying
case; issued a gratuitous condemnation of the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs and everyone
associated with them; and, in the process, became Chevron’s single greatest ally in its
eighteen-year effort to evade liability[.]” Id. at 2.
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THE COURT: The object of the whole game, according to
Donziger, is to make this so uncomfortable and so unpleasant
for Chevron that they’ll write up a check and be done with
it . . . . [P]ut a lot of pressure on the courts to feed them a record
in part false . . . in order to persuade Chevron to come up with
some money. Now, do the phrases Hobbs Act, extortion,
RICO, have any bearing here?132
A few months later, Chevron launched Chevron v. Donziger,133 a
civil RICO case against Donziger and others.134 Judge Kaplan
presided, held a six-week bench trial, and issued a nearly fivehundred page opinion. It ruled that Donziger had used “corrupt
means” to obtain the Lago Agrio Judgment, including corruption and
coercion of judges and judicial officials, fraud, deception, extortion,
obstruction of justice, and money laundering.135 He therefore
enjoined the plaintiffs from enforcing the judgment in the United
States.136
The PCA Arbitration. In September 2009, Chevron commenced
an international investment arbitration against the Republic of
Ecuador, administered by the PCA in the Hague and brought under a
1993 BIT between the United States and Ecuador.137 In the
arbitration, Chevron argued that Ecuador failed to honor a 1995
settlement it had signed with Texaco.138 Chevron is asking the arbitral
tribunal to find that Ecuador colluded with the plaintiffs to bring the
underlying litigation and deny Chevron justice in its courts, that
Ecuador abused its criminal justice system by using it to coerce
Chevron, and that Ecuador is responsible for all damages Chevron
incurs from defending against the Judgment.139
A day before the Second Circuit declined to serve as “a
transnational arbiter” over enforcement actions overseas, the
arbitrators presiding over the PCA arbitration issued interim orders
directing Ecuador to take all measures within its power to prevent the
Judgment from becoming final and enforceable.140 These proceedings

132. Id. at 25 (first alteration in original).
133. 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO decision).
134. See id. at 544.
135. Id. at 578, 582, 593, 594, 644.
136. Id. at 641–42.
137. See Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration, supra note 105, at 1.
138. Id. at 15.
139. See id. at 15–18.
140. Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on
Interim Measures, at 16 (UNCITRAL Arb. Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/ita0173.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z5UG-6UDU].
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are not only conducted in parallel to the domestic ones but also
function as a de facto appeal over the Ecuadorian courts.141 One
commentator described the arbitration as an “institutional failure,”
explaining that “[t]he spectacle of private BIT arbitrators solemnly
condemning Ecuadorean courts as procedurally unjust while sitting as
closed, ex parte accusatory tribunals would be funny if so much were
not at stake.”142
Because of the unparalleled scope of discovery and the extensive
pleadings, the CED presents a unique view of the litigants’
perceptions. The FNC, global injunction, and RICO proceedings
provide evidence and findings regarding corruption. The Ecuadorian
appeals, PCA arbitration, and the parallel RICO litigation present
examples of iterative play. (The RICO decision also provides a
description of the iterative play at the Ecuadorian trial level.) These
are all explored below.
Moreover, and more specifically, as the following Sections
demonstrate, there is ample evidence that the parties to the CED
were well aware of and concerned about the corruption that appeared
to be prevalent in the Ecuadorian judiciary at the time the Lago
Agrio litigation began.143 The following Sections also evidence that
the plaintiffs and their lawyers worried that the judicial system was
rigged in favor of any oil company, especially in favor of
Texaco/Chevron (tainting-corruption), and that these concerns
shaped the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy.144 This litigation strategy, the
District Court found, ultimately turned into various forms of
disloyalty corruption.145
In other words, there are numerous indications that in this realworld case, a perception of a corrupt judiciary led to actual
corruption, precisely as our formal model predicts. The record in this
case illustrates how perceptions of corruption create a prisoner’s
dilemma whereby, though it is optimal for both parties to
“cooperate,” i.e., avoid corruption, in fact, parties “defected,” i.e.,
chose to act corruptly. It appears, therefore, the assumptions made in
141. See Michael D. Goldhaber, The Rise of Arbitral Power over Domestic Courts, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 373, 374 (2013).
142. Neuborne, supra note 101, at 520–21 (“The private arbitrators permitted Chevron
to attack the legitimacy of Ecuadorean courts, the integrity of the victims’ lawyers, and the
moral integrity of the Ecuadorean trial judge without permitting the affected victims, the
accused lawyers, or the accused judges an opportunity to defend themselves in person.”).
143. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
144. See infra Section II.B.
145. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 557–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(RICO decision) (describing the types of misconduct used in the Lago Agrio court).
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the formal model, as well as the conclusions of the model, are true to
life.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Perceptions of Corruption Prior to the Filing of the
Lago Agrio Litigation
[T]his is something you would never do in the United States,
but Ecuador, you know, this is how the game is played, it’s
dirty. . . . We have to occasionally use pressure tactics to
neutralize their [Chevron’s] corruption.
—Steven Donziger, lead plaintiffs’ attorney146

The plaintiffs’ attorneys insisted that the Ecuadorian judiciary
was “weak and corrupt and did not provide impartial tribunals” back
in the 1990s.147 This observation was made well before the filing of the
Lago Agrio litigation in Ecuadorian courts and in reaction to
Chevron’s motion to dismiss on FNC grounds. In a 1994
memorandum in opposition to Texaco’s motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs asserted that:
In matters involving the petroleum industry, the Ecuadoran
judiciary lacks sufficient independence. In Phoenix Canada Oil
Co. v. Texaco. Inc., the court found Ecuador an inadequate
alternative forum due to the Ecuadoran military’s control of the
judiciary. . . . The Ecuadoran military is still funded exclusively
from oil revenues and those in Ecuador who protest the oil
industry’s substandard practices face serious reprisals from the
military.148
Indeed, Texaco’s attorney testified that in a dispute between a
municipality and Petroecuador, a state-controlled oil company and
Texaco’s co-venturer, the former has come to the conclusion that “it
is impossible to win an action [against an oil company] . . . where the
political influence of the petroleum exploitation company, which
income is essential for the national economy, is a lot stronger than the
fair demands of a small town in the middle of the jungle.”149
The District Court’s subsequent finding in the RICO decision
conveys the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ beliefs about the Ecuadorian courts
146. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 32, at 19 (third alteration in original).
(bold typeface omitted).
147. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
148. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No 93 Civ. 7527(VLB), 1994 WL 16188155, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1994) (internal references omitted).
149. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470
(2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-7756L) (quoting Affidavit of Luis Tobar Sanchez at A6709 to 10,
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002)).
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and the acceptable practices before them. These beliefs existed prior
to the filing of the Lago Agrio litigation and persisted throughout:
During Aguinda, [Donziger] argued strenuously that Ecuador
was not an adequate forum because the Ecuadorian judiciary
was weak . . . . After the Lago Agrio case began, he made
repeated statements—many on camera—in which he amplified
this view. For example:


“They’re all [i.e., the Ecuadorian judges] corrupt! It’s—it’s
their birthright to be corrupt.”
...



“You know, what . . . just happened with this judge, um, is
sort of sad to me because it represents the fact that the
judicial system here is so utterly weak—like the only way
you can secure a fair trial is if you do things like that, like go
in and confront the judge with media around . . . .”
...



“We believe they make decisions based on who they fear
the most, not based on what the laws should
dictate. . . . [W]e want to send a message to the court that,
‘don’t fuck with us anymore—not now, and not—not later,
and never.’ ”150

The significance of the FNC proceedings for understanding the
parties’ perceptions of corruption and its effects on litigation behavior
extends beyond the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ perception of Ecuadorian
corruption. Some argued that the strategic thinking behind the FNC
motion, including the willingness to stipulate to Ecuadorian
jurisdiction in the future, reflected Chevron’s confidence of its own
grip on the Ecuadorian judicial and political systems—systems that
were controlled, at the time, by a pro-foreign business, right-wing
government.151 This led Chevron to believe that even if plaintiffs
found the resources and inclination to re-initiate action in Ecuador, it
could have confidence that such legal action would be futile.152
150. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 392–93 (third and fifth alterations in original)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
151. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 101, at 518–19.
152. Burt Neuborne, Inez Miliholland Professor of Civil Liberties, N.Y. Univ.,
Comments at the Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation Symposium: Lessons from
Chevron (Feb. 8, 2013), https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford-journal-complexlitigation-sjcl/symposia [http://perma.cc/ZX93-BWUH]; see also Neuborne, supra note 101,
at 518; 60 Minutes Interview, supra note 114 (broadcasting Donziger stating his belief that
Chevron thought plaintiffs would not refile in Ecuador). Empirical findings support such
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While not specifically relating to corruption, for purposes of
completeness we should note that Chevron was accused of dishonest
litigation from an early stage in the proceeding. According to
Ecuador’s Ambassador to the United States, “Chevron . . . has itself
committed a fraud on the Ecuadorian courts.”153 In so doing, she
refers to allegations that Chevron concealed TexPet’s contamination
from the Lago Agrio court and that Chevron conducted unauthorized
inspections that revealed to Chevron “clean spots” and “dirty spots,”
information it then used to attempt to mislead the court.154
Chevron has also been accused of illegal acts. The Government
of Ecuador alleges, in the PCA Arbitration, that a Chevron
contractor, Diego Borja, attempted to entrap then-presiding Judge
Núñez by illegally recording him and attempting to get him to admit
to accepting bribes.155 It also alleges that after Borja engaged in such
illegal activities to further Chevron’s litigation strategy, Chevron
escorted him and his wife out of Ecuador and provided them with
an assumption. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 n.5 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring) (discussing David Robertson’s research, which found that “[o]f
the 55 personal injury cases [dismissed in the period studied], only one was actually tried
in a foreign court”). Under this view, Chevron’s fortunes shifted in 2006 when Rafael
Correa, a left-wing politician with affinities to Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, was elected
President of Ecuador. See Neuborne, supra note 101, at 519; More of the Same, Please,
THE ECONOMIST: AMERICAS VIEW (Feb. 18, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.economist.com
/blogs/americasview/2013/02/ecuadors-presidential- [http://perma.cc/Q9HQ-GSRS]. The
District Court explained the (perceived and actual) significance of the change of
administrations:
Donziger explained the fundamental change that the [2006] election had worked.
The [plaintiffs] had “gone basically from a situation where we couldn’t get in the
door to meet many of these people in these positions in the government to one
where they’re actually asking us to come and asking what they can do. . . .” The
[plaintiffs] “had connections” with the new administration, Donziger said. “They
love us and they want to help us.”
Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (internal brackets omitted).
153. Nathalie Cely Suarez, Let’s Focus on the Real Issues, LETTERS BLOGATORY
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://lettersblogatory.com/2014/03/17/republic-ecuador-responds-judgekaplan/ [http://perma.cc/7B74-VYUP].
154. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23, Respondent’s
Track 2 Rejoinder on the Merits of the Republic of Ecuador, at 63–82 (UNCITRAL Arb.
Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Respondent’s Track 2 Rejoinder]; Suarez, supra note 153. The
Ambassador stated that there is overwhelming evidence that Texaco directed its officers
to destroy documents and evidence of spills and accidents. Respondent’s Track 2
Rejoinder, supra, at 6, ¶ 12. In support she cited an internal Texaco memo that instructs
the destruction of some oil spill reports. See Letter from R. C. Shields, Chairman of the
Bd., to N.E. Crawford, Acting Manager, Texaco Petroleum Co. (July 17, 1972),
http://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/n1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q2CCGTC9] (memo entitled “Reporting of Environmental Incidents [–] New Instructions”).
155. See Respondent’s Track 2 Rejoinder, supra note 154, at 7–8.
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luxurious accommodations in the United States and more than $2
million in monetary benefits for his testimony.156 Finally, paid-for
testimony also played a key role in Chevron’s RICO case against
Donziger, as discussed below.157
Relatedly, Donziger’s lawyers have also represented his state of
mind as it related to perceptions of corruption and its effects on
litigation behavior, claiming that:
Mr. Donziger went to the courthouse [the day the opening
quote was made, supra text accompanying note 146] only to
combat Chevron’s efforts to corrupt the case . . . . [I]n the
outtakes . . . Mr. Donziger emphasizes his displeasure that
Chevron has forced him into an unconventional battle against
the company’s efforts to corrupt and sabotage the Lago Agrio
Litigation: “You don’t have to do this in the United States. It’s
dirty. I hate it.” “I would prefer to litigate the case, but
unfortunately the system isn’t fair.”158
These perceptions are no doubt also informed by the backdrop
of general transnational corporate corruption. It is evident from a
casual look at the general media that corporations sometimes act
corruptly overseas.159 Recent high-profile examples include Walmart’s
Mexico bribery scandal160 and the investigation over JPMorgan’s
practices of hiring the children of high-ranked officials in China.161
The list of corporations engaged in transnational corruption goes on
and on, and it includes additional household names such as

156. See id. at 8–9.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 194–98. The District Court’s heavy reliance on
such testimony is now the subject of an appeal pending before the Second Circuit.
158. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 32, at 19 (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted) (bold typeface omitted).
159. Some corporations have even been caught on tape, as in the case of the deep web
of bribery and other forms of criminality involving Vladimiro Montesinos, the de facto
commander of Peru’s army and intelligence agencies, and executives in the mining
industry. See Lowell Bergman, Montesinos’s Web, PBS: FRONTLINE WORLD, http://www
.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/peru404/web.html [http://perma.cc/97GM-4YWR] (sharing
excerpts from secret recordings videotaped by Montesinos).
160. See Stephanie Clifford & Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart’s U.S. Expansion Plans
Complicated by Bribery Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/04/30/business/wal-mart-bribery-scandal-complicates-us-expansion-plans.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/6XJZ-MTJQ].
161. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by
JPMorgan Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 17, 2013), http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/hiring-in-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny/
[http://perma.cc/3UD3-864J].
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Daimler,162 Johnson & Johnson,163 and Halliburton.164 Of course,
American corporations are not the only offenders, and the United
States is not the only one prosecuting. GlaxoSmithKline, the British
drug giant, was recently fined nearly half a billion dollars by the
Chinese government.165 The German giant Siemens, one of the
world’s biggest companies, has agreed to pay $1.6 billion “in the
largest fine for bribery in modern corporate history.”166
The problem of corporate corruption is so significant that the
Department of Justice has recently stated that enforcement of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act167 (“FCPA”)—which prohibits
American firms from bribing foreign officials to obtain business—has
become a top priority, second only to antiterrorism prosecutions.168
American corporations’ strident protests that the lacking enforcement
of anticorruption laws in other developed nations places them at a
disadvantage169 is further evidence that corporate corruption overseas
is a significant phenomenon that they experience. Corporate
corruption is also the subject of empirical investigation and
monitoring by NGOs and intergovernmental organizations such as
the World Bank,170 the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development,171 and Transparency International.172

162. Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness
/21siemens.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/VT54-AWLS].
163. See id.
164. See id. (“Albert J. Stanley, a legendary figure in the oil patch and the former chief
executive of the KBR subsidiary of Halliburton, recently pleaded guilty to charges of
paying bribes and skimming millions for himself.”).
165. Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500
Million in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09
/20/business/international/gsk-china-fines.html [http://perma.cc/FZM6-5722].
166. Schubert & Miller, supra note 162 (observing that what is remarkable about the
case is “how entrenched corruption had become at a sprawling, sophisticated corporation
that externally embraced the nostrums of a transparent global marketplace built on
legitimate transactions”).
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
168. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 781, 782 (2011).
169. See id. at 824.
170. See Corruption, WORLD BANK GROUP: ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, http://www
.enterprisesurveys.org/ [http://perma.cc/V7ZK-82CD] (surveying experience and
perceptions of corruption with data collected from face-to-face interviews with top
managers and business owners in over 130,000 companies in 135 economies).
171. See Economic Data, EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.,
http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data.html [http://perma.cc
/H9WR-PR85]. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development partners with
the World Bank to develop “Business Environment and Enterprise Surveys.” See id.
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Chevron’s Perceptions of the Corruption of the Ecuadorian
Judicial System

Taking Chevron’s (previously Texaco’s) legal positions as
formulated in its court filings at face value, one can conclude that
perceptions of corruption did not emerge before 1999. In 1999,
Texaco stipulated173 that it would not contest Ecuadorian courts’
jurisdiction in connection with the dismissal of the Aguinda Litigation
on FNC grounds: “As part of its argument that the case belonged in
Ecuador and not the United States—and, as will be seen, a great
irony—Texaco argued that Ecuador would be an adequate alternative
forum because it had an independent judiciary that provided fair
trials.”174
While on the plaintiffs’ side it is possible to identify a single
“mastermind,” namely Donziger,175 as well as access direct evidence
of his state of mind in the form of his diary entries and candid oncamera commentary, the same is not true on the defendant’s side.
Chevron is a very large entity with multiple senior agents, both inhouse and in the form of outside counsel. Nonetheless, the record is
replete with clues of Chevron’s senior executives’ early-on beliefs that
the Ecuadorian judiciary is, in fact, corrupt, that plaintiffs’ attorneys
systemically exert political pressure and manipulate the legal
processes in susceptible foreign jurisdictions,176 and that many foreign
judgments in transnational litigations of the type discussed herein
emanate from politicized and corrupt judicial environments: “Do you
think that this judge is going to [have] any independence? Is [she]
172. Transparency International produces the Bribe Payer Index, which
“evaluates . . . the likelihood of firms from the world’s industrialised countries to bribe
abroad [by] survey[ing] senior business executives . . . . The index includes a ranking of 22
of the world’s most economically influential countries according to the likelihood of their
firms to bribe abroad.” Bribe Payer’s Index, GATEWAY: CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT
TOOLBOX, http://gateway.transparency.org/tools/detail/131 [http://perma.cc/LQP6-7KSX].
173. See Texaco Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Renewed Motions to
Dismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens and International Comity at 16–17, Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Nos. 93 Civ. 7527, 94 Civ. 9266).
174. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO
decision); see also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(granting Texaco’s motion to dismiss on FNC grounds).
175. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (“[T]he events ultimately center on one
man—Steven Donziger . . . .”).
176. Because the Chamber of Commerce is the lobbying group of American
businesses, it is fair to attribute its views of corruption of foreign judicial systems to its
constituents including Chevron, the third largest American corporation. This would
include the view that plaintiffs’ attorneys can and do easily “find a jurisdiction in which
corruption and/or general judicial and political dysfunction” guarantees them a favorable
verdict even if claims are frivolous. CHAMBER’S REPORT, supra note 52, at 6.
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going to look at the rule of law? Is [she] going to look at the contracts
and determine what’s legitimate and illegitimate?”177
Finally, as noted above, there is reason to believe Chevron’s
FNC strategy, which predated the filing of the Lago Agrio litigation
in Ecuador, betrayed a belief that Ecuadorian judicial processes can
be politically steered by the powerful (tainting-corruption).
D. Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Feel Compelled to “Go Over to the Dark
Side” and Are Found to Have Engaged in a Broad-Scale Corrupt
Scheme
Perhaps most telling for our purposes, i.e., for understanding
how the perceptions of corruption encourage acting corruptly
‘“preemptively” (defecting), is the following finding with which the
District Court chose to open its scorching RICO judgment:
[T]he Court finds that Donziger began his involvement in this
controversy with a desire to improve conditions in the area in
which his Ecuadorian clients live. To be sure, he sought also to
do well for himself while doing good for others, but there was
nothing wrong with that. In the end, however, he and the
Ecuadorian lawyers he led corrupted the Lago Agrio case.178
Also revealing is the District Court’s analysis of Donziger’s
diaries, in which the District Court actually identifies and describes
the turning point at which Donziger “goes over to the dark side.”179
The time is relatively early in the life of the Lago Agrio litigation, and
the occasion is the appointment of the court’s settling experts whose
role is to resolve disputes between the parties’ inspection experts’
reports. Donziger came up with an idea: to bring in a seemingly
independent institution, in fact paid for by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs,
to monitor the settling experts.180 The District Court quotes
Donziger’s contemporaneous accounts of the meeting in which he
solicits the paid-for monitoring, indicating this is the turning point:
“Deal with [the ‘independent’ monitor]—feel like I have gone over to
the dark side.”181 The account goes on: “[t]his was my one bargain
with the devil, but we can’t win with the devil [because] they can
177. See 60 Minutes Interview, supra note 114 (interviewing Sylvia Garrigo, Chevron’s
Manager of Global Issues and Policy). In the same interview, the interviewer presented
the presiding judge with the question: “Chevron says they can’t get a fair trial in your
court.” Id.
178. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
179. See id. at 416–19.
180. Id. at 417.
181. Id. (quoting Donziger’s Diary, supra note 121, at 22).
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always pay more. Really frustrating, feel really boxed in”—further
indicating that this move to the dark side was motivated by a
perception that litigating within the bounds of the law would be
futile.182
For the purposes of illustrating the scenarios contemplated by
our formal model, it is worth zooming in on the heart of the corrupt
scheme: the ghostwriting of Judge Zambrano’s final judgment by the
discredited former Judge Guerra in exchange for a half-million dollar
bribe. (Guerra was the first judge to preside over the Lago Agrio
litigation. He was removed from the bench for misconduct.)183
Guerra’s ghostwriting career began with an arrangement that
had nothing to do with the Lago Agrio litigation and was made
exclusively between him and Zambrano. Zambrano was new to the
bench and inexperienced in civil cases, having previously served as a
prosecutor.184 He and Guerra entered into an agreement by which
Guerra ghostwrote decisions in various civil matters in exchange for
$1,000 a month.185 In late 2009, shortly after Zambrano was assigned
to the Lago Agrio litigation, Zambrano directed Guerra to contact
Chevron’s representatives to solicit a bribe in return for a decision in
favor of Chevron.186 The decision to reach out to Chevron was
motivated by a belief that Chevron had more resources and would
therefore pay a higher bribe than the plaintiffs.187 Guerra contacted
Chevron’s Ecuadorian lawyer repeatedly, but was rebuffed.188
Given this rejection, Zambrano decided to instead approach the
plaintiffs’ lawyers and attempt to solicit a bribe from them.189 This
overture was successful and resulted in an agreement that the case
would be expedited, that Chevron’s procedural motions would be
denied, and that plaintiffs’ lawyers would pay Guerra’s $1,000
monthly retainer in exchange for him drafting the orders in the
case.190 Zambrano was rotated off the case and then reappointed.191
When he was reappointed, he once again instructed Guerra to reach
out to Chevron to solicit a bribe.192 After some back and forth, the
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 417–18 (quoting Donziger’s Diary, supra note 121, at 22).
See id. at 502.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 511, 513.
Id. at 513.
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plaintiffs’ lawyers ultimately accepted the proposition and bribed
Zambrano to allow them to ghostwrite the final judgment in exchange
for half a million dollars from the proceeds of the litigation.193
The epilogue came in 2012. As noted above, the $18 billion
judgment against Chevron was issued in February 2011.194 In April
2012, Zambrano, recently removed from the bench, instructed Guerra
to approach Chevron with the truth and negotiate a handsome
payment in return for evidence of and testimony regarding the
fraudulent provenance of the judgment.195 Chevron paid Guerra
$48,000 for physical evidence he provided.196 Also, it paid for Guerra,
his wife, his son, and his son’s family to relocate to the United States
and paid for Guerra’s visa. Chevron paid him $10,000 a month and
paid his family’s health insurance. Chevron leased a car for him, paid
for his attorney for immigration matters as well as all dealings with
federal and state investigative authorities, and paid for any civil
litigation.197 His testimony was pivotal for the RICO case.198
E.

A Postscript on Foreign Perceptions of the American Judicial
System

To get a full view of litigants’ perceptions and consequent
litigation behavior, it is important to note that “[p]erceptions that
American courts are hostile to foreign parties are widespread”199
among “litigants, attorneys and commentators . . . [who believe that]
American courts, and in particular American juries, are hostile to
foreign parties.”200 Some empirical research substantiates such fear.
One of the only empirical studies on the topic has found that “[t]he
193. Id. at 515.
194. See id. at 516.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 517. While the District Court takes all these payments into account for
credibility assessment, and in that context notes that “Guerra admitted that he came
forward because he believed he would be ‘rewarded handsomely,’ ” id. at 518, it does not
regard these payments as illicit.
198. For example, “[t]he only evidence connecting the Plaintiffs with the draft
Judgment is Mr. Guerra’s purchased, hearsay testimony that Judge Zambrano told him
so.” Respondent’s Track 2 Rejoinder, supra note 154, at 113.
199. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497,
1497 (2003); see also Kevin Claremont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American
Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1120 (1996) (“[M]any people believe that litigants have
much to fear in courts foreign to them. In particular, non-Americans fare badly in
American courts. Foreigners believe this. Even Americans believe this.”); Moore, supra,
at 1497 n.1, 1499 n.8 (providing literature reviews of foreign perceptions of American
courts and the lack of empirical analysis of xenophobia’s effects).
200. Moore, supra note 199, at 1499.

94 N.C. L. REV. 751 (2016)

2016]

TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION

795

data validates concerns that American courts, and American juries in
particular, exhibit a xenophobic bias. . . . [But that] there is no
significant difference in win rate . . . when judges adjudicate.”201
Such perceptions, whether justified or not, may further enhance
plaintiffs’ ex ante belief when devising transnational litigation
strategy that they are backed into a corner, facing an institutional and
procedural uphill battle irrespective of the merits of their clients’ case.
For example, in June 2011, Donziger’s team petitioned the Second
Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus to direct Judge Kaplan to recuse
himself from the Chevron v. Donziger matter (the RICO action) and
the associated Chevron v. Salazar matter. It was their perception that
Judge Kaplan did not maintain the appearance of impartiality. They
described how:
Judge Kaplan shared his belief that “important” companies like
Chevron must be insulated from judgment collection efforts
. . . . “[W]e are dealing here with a company of considerable
otherwise importance to our economy that employs thousands
all over the world, that supplies a group of commodities . . . on
which every one of us depends . . . . I don’t think there is
anybody in this courtroom who wants to pull his car into a gas
station to fill up and find that there isn’t any gas there because
these folks have attached it in Singapore or wherever else.”202
In their petition, which was denied, the plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote:
The world is closely watching this landmark case. And what the
world sees is an American company that fought for nine years
to wrest jurisdiction from the American courts in favor of
litigating the case in Ecuador, only to come running back to the
United States for a preordained, home-cooked bailout when
things did not go as well as planned in Ecuador. Worse yet, it
sees a federal district court that is not just willing, but
apparently determined, to overlook the fact that said American
company just spent the last eight years committing a series of
outrageous abuses against the Ecuadorian courts it swore to
respect as it begged to move the case there.203

201. Id. at 1504.
202. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 32, at 11 n.7 (second alteration in
original).
203. Id. at 5–6.
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As noted, the Second Circuit denied the petition.204 (In fact, the
Second Circuit denied multiple attempts by the plaintiffs to recuse
Judge Kaplan or require reassignment of the case).205 But Ecuador’s
Ambassador to the United States echoed the sentiment three years
later, after the RICO decision was handed down. She wrote:
Judge Kaplan . . . has since chosen to accept the testimony of a
Chevron witness who has admitted to being paid hundreds of
thousands of dollars in cash and literally millions of dollars in
financial benefits by Chevron, yet Judge Kaplan simultaneously
chose not to consider evidence relating to Chevron’s own
misconduct . . . .206
Let us sum up. It appears that the real world scenario of the
CED matches our formal model closely enough to demonstrate the
traction the model gives us on the problem. First, plaintiffs’ counsel
(on Donziger’s claims) perceived the Ecuadorian judicial process as
corruptible. Moreover, from the standpoint of plaintiffs, Chevron’s
filing of the FNC motion constitutes a dishonest act: with it, the court
moved the litigation from a relatively neutral forum into one that was
biased in Chevron’s favor. It was rational for Chevron to do so.
Moreover, Chevron did so by means not subject to the sanctions
attached to bribery. In effect, from the plaintiffs’ standpoint, it
costlessly corrupted the judicial process207 (“costlessly” here is used in
the strategic sense to mean without risk or punishment—from
plaintiffs’ standpoint Chevron managed to corruptly shift the
probability of victory in its favor without paying any price for it).
Moreover, given the presence of reasonable disagreement about
which courts are biased and toward whom, it seems impossible for
policymakers to create a regulatory structure that can assign blame
and punishment to litigants for choosing biased courts.
By contrast, plaintiffs do not seem to have believed they had an
initial opportunity to pay a bribe, meaning the symmetrical features
of the prisoner’s dilemma are not wholly present. However, once the
matter landed in Ecuador, the opportunity presented itself to
plaintiffs, and they (claim that they) felt obliged to take it. Within the
Ecuadorian courts, we can interpret that either as plaintiffs
204. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-cv(L), 2011 WL 4375022, at *1 (2d Cir.
Sept. 19, 2011); see also Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 239 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012)
(global injunction decision) (acknowledging the denial in Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo).
205. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO
decision).
206. Suarez, supra note 153 (internal quotations omitted).
207. See supra Section II.B.

94 N.C. L. REV. 751 (2016)

2016]

TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION

797

responding in kind to the initial corrupting act, or, from the
defendants’ perspective, as plaintiffs carrying out the first corrupting
act, forcing defendants, in turn, to do more explicitly corrupt things—
like paying a confederate of the once-bribed judge handsomely for his
testimony in subsequent actions.
The sequencing of events makes the story significantly more
complicated than our sparse model, as real life always is, but the heart
remains: the parties both seem to have felt themselves driven by
perceptions of a corrupt act by the other (whether tainted-corrupt or
disloyal-corrupt) to carry out corrupting acts. Even though it seems
like both parties would have had reason to prefer honest litigation to
what happened, neither got it. Chevron, had it found itself in a fair
forum, could have settled the case for somewhere between $140
million and $1 billion dollars.208 Instead, it has spent more than that
amount fighting over numerous years and in various fora, in
substantial part because of its prior rational decision to remove the
case to a biased and corruptible forum. The plaintiffs, too, would have
at least had a chance at winning an enforceable judgment had they
been able to litigate in an incorruptible court. They now—thanks to
Donziger’s rational (but immoral) decision to bribe the court—find
themselves with a tainted judgment, and, like the defendant, with
staggering litigation costs and great uncertainty over enforceability.
We cannot be sure that the parties would have preferred honest
litigation to the consequences of mutual corruption—perhaps
Chevron is carrying out what we might call a “scorched earth”
strategy, in which it disregards its own litigation costs in an effort to
deter future plaintiffs. Alternatively, perhaps the plaintiffs are
carrying out what we might call a “frivolous gamble” strategy, in
which their case is so meritless that they fare better with a tainted
judgment than the defeat they could otherwise expect in a fair court.
But absent the power to read minds, it certainly is reasonable to
suspect that parties in the positions of those in the CED more
generally would find themselves frustrated by the incentives to litigate
corruptly in the face of their preferences for honest litigation—the
key feature of the prisoner’s dilemma.
The next Part retreats from the CED to suggest a systemic
solution to such problems.

208. See Keefe, supra note 31.
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III. A SYSTEMIC SOLUTION TO A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM: AN
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that the discussion of
corruption in the transnational process must expand beyond a
discussion of corrupt individuals or of any specific corporation that
exerts undue influence or engages in other foul play. The discussion
must expand to include systemic solutions to the structural features
that promote corrupt actions.
As already noted, the key conclusion from understanding the
transnational litigation prisoner’s dilemma is that no one wins from
the contemporary transnational litigationscape. Multinational
corporations are spending millions of dollars defending lawsuits that,
by their very transnational nature, are expensive and complex. Given
the high rate of ultimate nonenforcement of the foreign judgments,
such defendants believe the lawsuits themselves are frivolous.209
(Though the CED discussion should demonstrate, as Judge Kaplan
takes pains to note when he disclaims opining on the merits of the
plaintiffs’ case,210 that the collateral attacks on the judgments often
succeed as attacks on the quality of the foreign judicial system as
opposed to attacks on the actual merit of the plaintiffs’ claims.)
Plaintiffs, on their part, have no competent forum to turn to for
their day in court, other than such compromised foreign courts that
leave them with unenforceable judgments, even when they prevail on
the merits, and even when no corruption has been proven with
respect to their particular litigation.211 As the Bridgeway, Pahlavi,
Dole, and CED cases demonstrate, defendants such as Citibank, the
Shah’s sister, the Dole Corporation, the Dow Corporation, and
Chevron sometimes enjoy a de facto immunity from enforcement of
judgments.212 Since courts are public goods—meant to provide justice
209. For more critiques along these lines, see, for example, Jonathan C. Drimmer &
Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-Of-Court Tactics in
Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 473–88 (2011); Hal S. Scott,
What to Do About Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non-Conveniens Legislation, 49 HARV.
INT’L L.J. ONLINE 95 (2009) (sponsored by Dole Food Company, Inc.).
210. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 427 n.340 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (RICO decision) (“[T]he existence or absence of contamination in the Orienté was
not at issue in this trial.”).
211. See, e.g., Montré D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes
International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1159–60 (2007).
212. For similar critiques, see Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680–
81 (Tex. 1990) (Doggert, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘doctrine’ [of FNC that defendants]
advocate has nothing to do with fairness and convenience and everything to do with
immunizing multination corporations from accountability for their alleged torts causing
injury abroad.”).
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not only to the litigants but to communities as a whole—every
member of the global community is adversely affected by the absence
of a legal forum that affords plaintiffs their day in court and
defendants their due process rights.
Unfortunately, a focus on reforming judicial processes in
individual states, while important in its own right, is not likely to yield
solutions to the transnational litigation prisoner’s dilemma in the
foreseeable future. “[E]xperience has shown reform to be both
difficult and slow, especially where the independence and integrity of
the judiciary are in question.”213 While it is generally understood that
effective courts are a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition to
economic development and that “[b]adly performing courts are a
burden not only for litigants, but nations as a whole,” reforming
underperforming courts has nevertheless proved elusive.214
A. Existing Proposals for Change
Policymakers and commentators have offered various solutions
aimed at addressing at least some aspects of the rule of law gap
created by the limitations of current judicial fora at home and abroad.
Below is a nonexhaustive list of some of those suggestions and the
limitations built into them.
Gus Van Harten has argued for an international investment
court to deal with the deficiencies of ICSID, in particular its lack of
accountability, openness, independence, and the incoherence of its
jurisprudence.215 However, Professor Van Harten’s proposal is limited
to investment disputes under BITs and is motivated by the pubic law
nature of such disputes. This public nature—the distribution of public
funds to private businesses that is the essence of investment
arbitrations—he contends, makes private adjudication by private
contractors (arbitrators) inappropriate. Conversely, we are interested
first and foremost in private disputes between private parties of the
types discussed in the Introduction as well as those that are similar to

213. Globalizing Commercial Litigation, supra note 20, at 3. Dammann and Hansmann
go on to review and summarize the empirical literature. Id. at 31–32.
214. Id. at 3.
215. See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
PUBLIC LAW (2007). For earlier calls for designated international courts in this area, see
Arthur S. Miller, Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention, 53
AM. J. INT’L L. 371, 374 (1959); Sigmund Timberg, An International Trade Tribunal—A
Step Forward Short of Surrender of Sovereignty, 33 GEO. L.J. 373, 386 (1945).
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the CED.216 In fact, disputes like the CED represent the “negative
space,” to borrow a term from the arts, created by ICSID and the BIT
regime. The latter allows only for claims brought by foreign investors
but precludes claims against foreign investors of the kind brought by
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs.
Jens Dammann and Henry Hansmann start with a similar
premise: that private arbitration cannot fully replace public courts as
an alternative to ineffectual domestic courts. Professors Dammann
and Hansmann suggest opening up the well-functioning courts in the
developed world to litigants in the developing world. (This would be
done for a fee, so as not to externalize the cost to the forum state’s
taxpayer but to the contrary—provide a profit incentive for such
expansion of the courts’ role).217 However, they specifically limit their
proposal to disputes between merchants.218
Mark Gibney has written on the need for an international civil
court, but he made the point with respect to the effectuation of
human rights only.219 In so doing, Professor Gibney made and
demonstrated in the human rights context a pertinent point: that
individuals “have shown a far greater interest in seeing that justice is
served than states have.”220 This fact points towards an institutional
solution specifically, towards establishing a court where individuals
can seek justice.221 A larger, albeit admittedly very American point, is
that private enforcement of law is a useful tool in overall civil law
enforcement.222 It is also the case that it is a tool of growing global
acceptance.223
216. One can envision a future in which the growing discontent with ICSID and the
BIT regime may lead to a folding-in of such disputes under the jurisdiction of the
envisioned ICCJ.
217. See Globalizing Commercial Litigation, supra note 20, at 46–48.
218. Id. at 6 (limiting their proposal further to “litigation in which all parties consent to
employing the foreign court, either by means of a choice of forum clause in their original
contract or by mutual agreement after their dispute arises”).
219. See generally Mark Gibney, The Evolving Architecture of International Law: On
the Need for an International Civil Court, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 47 (2002)
(arguing for protection of human rights through international law).
220. Id. at 51.
221. Id. at 50–51 (demonstrating the point by discussing the flood of human rights
litigation brought in U.S. courts in the wake of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), and contrasting “the plethora of [ATCA] suits that have been brought in U.S.
courts with the sorry record of the U.S. Justice Department”).
222. For a discussion of private enforcement of the law and its highly American
character, see John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669–77 (1986). The role of private law enforcement in ensuring
civil justice for the otherwise powerless, however, has been recognized for centuries. See
Paul Gowder, Democracy, Solidarity, and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Athens, 62 BUFF.
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Burt Neuborne has proposed solving the CED by establishing a
claims facility modeled on the Remembrance, Responsibility, and the
Future Foundation. The Foundation was established to settle a series
of class actions arising out of the Holocaust era and is considered
“[t]he most successful use of the legal system, thus far, to provide
relief to individuals harmed by allegedly unlawful transnational
corporate behavior . . . .”224 Such a proposal can be generalized into an
argument that claims facilities may be useful in resolving cross-border
mass claims. But claims facilities are a form of alternative dispute
resolution (“ADR”), i.e., they are proper as alternatives to courts. In
fact, the shadow of in-court litigation is the source of claims facilities’
appeal and of their success.225
Also in the vein of ADR, the Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights,
John Ruggie, proposes that corporations “establish or participate in
effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and
communities” and that “[i]ndustry, multi-stakeholder and other
collaborative initiatives that are based on respect for human rightsrelated standards should ensure that effective grievance mechanisms
are available.”226 This proposal too is limited to human rights abuses
and does not stand alone. It is part of a larger remedial scheme that
envisions state-based judicial and non-judicial fora that individuals
can turn to. This proposal, too, has the limitations of ADR. It also has
the general limitations associated with self-regulation.227
L. REV. 1, 32 (2014) (describing Athenian recognition of the egalitarian importance of
private litigation).
223. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE
REDRESS IN EUROPE 102–05 (2008); Manuel A. Gómez, Will the Birds Stay South? The
Rise of Class Actions and Other Forms of Group Litigation Across Latin America, 43 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 481, 494–95 (2012); Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass
Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 306, 307–10 (2011); Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An
Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 7, 9–10 (2009).
224. Neuborne, supra note 101, at 510.
225. It is generally understood that claims facilities are effective because they offer
defendants global “legal peace” in the form of dismissal of pending claims (often class
actions) and preclusion of future claims. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of
Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (2005); Neuborne, supra note
101, at 515.
226. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, ¶¶ 29–30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
227. See, e.g., Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial
Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business
in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 158, 174–75 (2014) (“The
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Judge Mark Wolf of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts has outlined a proposal for a new international
anticorruption court modeled on or as part of the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”). The court would have jurisdiction over civil
as well as criminal fraud and corruption cases.228 We believe such a
mandate can be brought under the subject matter jurisdiction of the
envisioned ICCJ and, indeed, could create added incentives for
repeat-defendants to buy in to the new institution. And whereas an
anticorruption court would deal only with corruption, an ICCJ would
also resolve the problem of access to justice.
B.

The Need for an International Court of Civil Justice

As we have just signaled, we suggest that there is another
solution, one that would meet the criteria of the rule of law and
satisfy the conditions for avoiding the prisoner’s dilemma outlined in
Part I. That solution is to set up an ICCJ with subject matter
jurisdiction over cross-border mass torts as well as certain commercial
matters. As explained above, of the three things that would solve the
prisoner’s dilemma outlined in Part I, namely, facilitating repeat play,
facilitating enforceable side-bargains, and resolving the dispute in an
incorruptible institution, only the latter is presently a viable solution
in the litigation context. An indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
is not realistic between two litigants embroiled in a single (or even
multiple) legal disputes that will ultimately resolve in either
settlement or judgment without major changes to the internal legal
structure of collective and mass litigants across the world. Facilitating
enforceable side-bargains requires cooperation and is antithetical to
the adversarial nature of litigation. We are left, thus, with referring
the dispute to an incorruptible tribunal. The model, moreover,
teaches us that the forum needs to be perceived as incorruptible,
especially at the trial level where the first “game” is played.

impact of industry self-regulation to curb human rights violations through codes on
conduct is unclear at best. . . . [T]here is evidence that some companies may enact them
simply to deflect criticism in an attempt to prevent more effective regulation . . . [and] only
a very small percentage of transnational businesses have adopted them. . . . [A]ccessing
information about compliance from sources other than the companies is notoriously
difficult. . . . [T]here is no evidence demonstrating that companies that have adopted codes
of conduct have evinced better performance in their compliance with the standards set out
in those codes.”).
228. See MARK L. WOLF, BROOKINGS INST., THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ANTICORRUPTION COURT 10–11 (July 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files
/papers/2014/07/international%20anti%20corruption%20court%20wolf
/anticorruptioncourtwolffinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/72UF-C4HE].
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Such a forum currently does not exist. Because of their limited
jurisdiction, neither international commercial arbitration nor
international investment arbitration can cover the kind of disputes we
analyze here. U.S. courts could have served such a purpose, at least in
cases where one of the parties is an American individual or entity.
However, the trend in U.S. courts to limit foreigners’ access,229
epitomized by the 2013 Kiobel decision, renders that option de facto
unavailable. European courts are also not available to hear most of
the kinds of disputes we are concerned with if for no other reason
than because none would have personal jurisdiction over most of the
disputes under discussion. An ICCJ—to which states delegate the
authority to decide the kind of disputes we discuss here (where states’
own courts will not decide such disputes) and that is designed to meet
the requirements of the rule of law—would meet the criteria above
and would solve the problem of the missing forum. Such an
independent supranational court should be perceived as
incorruptible, in part because its judges will be subject to close
monitoring from an international audience, and hence, litigants will
expect that such judges will find it more difficult and costly to take
bribes. Since perceptions of corruptibility are a condition of the
prisoner’s dilemma, an ICCJ should eliminate the prisoner’s dilemma.
An obvious reaction may be that an ICCJ seems like an idealistic
pipe dream. This, in fact, has been the reaction to many proposals for
new international courts that have subsequently become a reality.230

229. Id.; Alford, supra note 26, at 1754.
230. Consider, for example, Sir William Randal Cremer’s 1905 Nobel Lecture, titled
“The Progress and Advantages of International Arbitration”:
Thirty-four years ago, when the organization of which I am secretary formulated a
plan for the establishment of a “High Court of Nations,” we were laughed to scorn
as mere theorists and utopians, the scoffers emphatically declaring that no two
countries in the world would ever agree to take part in the establishment of such a
court. Today we proudly point to the fact that the Hague Tribunal has been
established; and notwithstanding the unfortunate blow it received in the early
stages of its existence by the Boer War, and the attempt on the part of some
nations to boycott it, there is now a general consensus of opinion that it has come
to stay.
Randal Cremer, The Progress and Advantages of International Arbitration,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates
/1903/cremer-lecture.html [http://perma.cc/GAN4-77CQ]. To give another example, the
idea for an International Criminal Court was first articulated in the Treaty of Versailles
(1919), which provided that Kaiser Wilhelm II be prosecuted by an international tribunal
for a “supreme offence against international morality.” See John P. Cerone, U.S. Attitudes
Toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES:
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 131, 134 (Cesare
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The reality is that behind the coming-into-being of each international
court is an idiosyncratic confluence of socio-historical global forces
converging to make it a reality, often over the course of many
decades.231 The long and winding road towards a new international
court is usually characterized by ebbs and flows of support232 and by
tweaks or even major overhauls of design features, both before and
over the life of an institution. It is not unusual for “blueprints” to be
developed over decades and to collect dust until the time is right and
conditions are ripe. History shows, specifically, that “new style”
international courts of the post-Cold War era—courts with
compulsory jurisdiction that allow non-state actors to initiate
litigation—come into being out of “disappointment, fueling legal
idealists, who drew lessons and stood ready to advocate for more
effective international legal institutions when the opportunity
presented itself.”233 Charismatic visionaries and social entrepreneurs
can play a key role. So can social movements of scholars, jurists inside
and outside of academia, practitioners, politicians, and others.234 Such
social movements allow broad “constituencies of support” to come
together by “linking communities that care about the larger policy
domain (for example, free-trade, human rights, and such), with
supporters of the rule of law, with advocates for the particular legal
regime . . . with self-interested litigants pursuing personal agendas and
with the legal community of lawyers, judges, and scholars.”235 This
Article, and the larger project it is a part of, aims to start a
conversation and the development of such a blueprint.
Another possible objection is that the establishment of an ICCJ
is not politically viable because U.S.-based multinational
corporations, and politicians who support them, are likely to oppose a
court in which they may be successfully sued. Consequently, this
argument goes, the United States is unlikely to sign on to such a
regime. Our response to this objection is threefold. First, a welldesigned ICCJ can dramatically decrease the direct costs of litigation
P. R. Romano ed., 2009) (quoting Treaty of Versailles art. 227, June 28, 1919). The idea
became a reality a century later with the establishment of the ICC in 2002.
231. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2004) (examining and comparing the creation and efficacy of
a wide variety of international courts); STEINITZ, supra note 5 (forthcoming book
advocating for an ICCJ to resolve cross-border mass torts and discussing a blueprint for
such court).
232. See generally STEINITZ, supra note 5 (forthcoming book discussing in part
common characteristics of the creation of international courts).
233. ALTER, supra note 231, at 118.
234. Id. at 19–21.
235. Id. at 5.
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to all litigating parties. Second, an ICCJ can reduce the even-higher
indirect costs of litigation. And third, an ICCJ can be designed to go
even further than cost reduction and provide a forum for cross-border
litigation that is currently not available, but corporations may seek to
bring or otherwise be interested in. It is instructive to note here that
in another famous cross-border mass tort litigation, the BP oil spill, it
was businesses rather than individuals that received a larger share of
the compensation provided by the ensuing claims facility.236 We
develop these three responses in the following paragraphs. But first,
as a threshold matter, we note that the ICCJ’s jurisdiction could be
complementary, as it is at the ICC.237 This means that, if the home
jurisdiction of the multinational corporation is willing and able to
hear the case, the ICCJ will not exercise jurisdiction.238 Allowing
American corporations to “remove” the case to an American court
means that unless one is willing to endorse the proposition that mass
torts require no compensation, the solution we offer is almost morally
inescapable.
The primary costs of litigation across borders include, for
example, the cost of litigating FNC motions and enforcement
proceedings as well as the costs of parallel litigation. Examples of all
of these in the context of the CED are described above, and the
reader will recall that the primary cost of the ongoing litigation to
Chevron has been estimated to exceed $1 billion.239 Such direct cost,
in turn, can increase exponentially because foreign courts’ decisions
do not have full preclusive effect.240
On top of all of these direct costs, one must consider the hidden
costs of litigation, which can exceed the primary costs.241 Hidden costs
are major restrictions on a corporation’s ability to do business—for

236. Businesses, including those with multibillion dollar revenues, were the biggest
benefactors of the compensation scheme set up by BP, as required by the unique regime of
the Oil Pollution Act, to remediate its devastation of the Gulf Coast. See Steinitz, The
Case for an ICCJ, supra note 5, at 75–76 (contrasting the speedy compensation of
American cross-border torts victims in the BP Oil spill with the CED).
237. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 20, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
238. “Able,” in this context, would mean, inter alia, noncorrupt. See Steinitz, The Case
for an ICCJ, supra note 5, at 82.
239. See supra text accompanying note 31.
240. See, e.g., Philip L. McGarrigle, The Role of Foreign Judgments in Patent Litigation:
A Perspective and Strategic Overview, 39 IDEA 107, 112 (1998) (discussing how U.S.
courts re-litigate factual findings of foreign courts).
241. See Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1155,
1171–72 (2015); see also Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 367, 373–75 (2009).
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example, to carry out mergers or acquisitions and to obtain debt or
equity—that are imposed because a large legal dispute is ongoing.242
Certain large-scale litigation has also been known to depress the
defending corporation’s stock price.243 The hidden costs of
transnational litigation also include, e.g., the economic impact of the
backlash against a multinational corporation created by the current
transnational litigationscape which includes “the increasing adoption
by foreign jurisdictions of American-style pro-plaintiff procedural
features, at times tailored to apply only to cases brought against
American multinational corporations; the use of domestic criminal
procedures against corporate executives in host states; and
expropriation and even regime change from pro-[FDI] to populist
regimes.”244
An example of a hybrid primary and secondary cost of litigation
is contained in the District Court’s analysis of “irreparable harm” in
the litigation to enjoin enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment. The
District Court noted that without an injunction, “Chevron would be
forced to defend itself and litigate the enforceability of the
Ecuadorian judgment in multiple proceedings. . . . [Its] assets would
be seized . . . thus disrupting Chevron’s supply chain . . . damaging
‘Chevron’s business reputation . . . and harm[ing] the valuable

242. See generally Steinitz, supra note 241 (discussing the hidden costs of litigation to
corporate plaintiffs and providing examples of litigations that have proven to be obstacles
to mergers and other deals); Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window?
Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1903–06 (2013) (discussing the valuation
and accounting problems presented by litigation); see also, Molot, supra note 241, at 373–
75 (providing a somewhat different formulation of similar problems litigation presents to
corporate defendants, referred to by Molot as “tertiary costs”).
243. In the CED case, at one point at least one stock research company predicted a 5%
decline in Chevron’s stock valuation should the $9 billion Ecuadorian judgment be
enforced and further opined that “long-term impact could include tighter anti-pollution
regulations and stricter enforcement. This would likely raise costs for oil companies, an
effect that would be reflected in profit margins.” See SIMON BILLENNESS & SANFORD
LEWIS, AMAZON WATCH & RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL RISKS TO CHEVRON CORPORATION FROM AGUINDA V.
CHEVRONTEXACO 5 (May 11, 2011), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/ChevronEcuador_Risk_Analysis_Report_May2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/DV78-46KG] (quoting
Trefis, Chevron Could Take Big Hit from Potential Payout in Ecuador, THE STREET (Mar.
31, 2011), http://www.thestreet.com/story/11068458/1/chevron-could-take-big-hit-frompotential-payout-in-equador.html [perma.cc/5EDZ-YJX4]). For empirical work on the
effects of litigation on a company’s stock price, see David M. Cutler & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the
Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157, 157–58 (1988).
244. Steinitz, The Case for an ICCJ, supra note 5, at 81.
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customer goodwill Chevron has developed over the past 130
years.’ ”245
An ICCJ can vastly reduce such costs “through procedural
features that ensure that non-meritorious cases are dismissed
relatively early, summary judgment-like” and through “limitations on
American-style pro-plaintiff procedural features in favor of a more
continental design: no jury, less discovery, and no punitive
damages.”246 The benefits of these features can be compounded if
signatories to the ICCJ’s underlying instrument agree that its holdings
and judgments have global preclusive effects. Res judicata will then
provide “global legal peace” to a given dispute at the end of a single
litigation and collateral estoppel will reduce the costs of other
proceedings.247
An ICCJ’s subject matter jurisdiction can be formulated to
include matters that corporations care about but currently find
difficult to enforce. Perhaps the best example of such subject matter is
the law of anticorruption. Judge Wolf, the former chief federal public
corruption prosecutor in Massachusetts, made the case for
internationalizing the adjudication of corruption.248 Corruption
violates the laws of virtually every nation on earth as well as a number
of international instruments.249 However, national authorities and
their highest-ranking officials have no incentives, and often have
disincentives, to pursue anticorruption enforcement. They
themselves, their friends, and their family members might be the

245. Preliminary Injunction of U.S. Federal District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan at 65,
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO decision)
(quoting Declaration of Rex J. Mitchell in Support of Chevron Corporation’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at ¶¶ 8, 10, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (RICO decision)).
246. Steinitz, The Case for an ICCJ, supra note 5, at 82. While eliminating such features
may seem too pro-defendant, there is no evidence that other legal systems are more prodefendant than the American system, which is unique in its embrace of these procedures.
As discussed, supra text accompanying notes 45–50, pro-defendant biases that may not
exist in other, more “protectionist” legal cultures, arguably balance out any pro-plaintiff
effects of such measures. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that any common lawcivil law hybrid procedure negotiated by the Member States of the future ICCJ as well as a
diverse bench including judges from the developing world will be more favorable towards
multinational corporations even without such features.
247. Steinitz, The Case for an ICCJ, supra note 5, at 82; see also Samuel Issacharoff &
D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74
LA. L. REV. 397, 413 (2014) (arguing that costly class action litigation was preferable to
the BP administrative program because it allowed BP to “purchase” legal peace).
248. See generally WOLF, supra note 228 (arguing for an international anticorruption
court).
249. See id. at 2.
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beneficiaries or agents of corruption.250 Judge Wolf analogizes to the
American experience where federal prosecutors and courts pursue
corruption at the state and local level precisely because they are more
likely to be removed from it than are state and local officials.251
National anticorruption enforcement is further complicated in the
international context by the “quiet complicity of other nations, which
benefit from foreign investment and official favor.”252 American
corporations are likely to be keen on seeing anticorruption laws
enforced, which as stated above is likely to happen in a robust way
outside the United States only if adjudication is internationalized,
because corruption represents a major inefficiency and distorts
market forces.253 American corporations, in particular, contend that
the high enforcement of the American FCPA254 coupled with the low
or no enforcement of anticorruption laws in other developed
countries puts them at a competitive disadvantage.255 Across-the-aisle
constituencies, i.e., human rights advocates, should be similarly eager
to see such law enforcement. According to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, “[C]orruption is an enormous
obstacle to the realization of all human rights—civil, political,
economic, social and cultural, as well as the right to development.
Corruption violates the core human rights principles of transparency,
accountability, non-discrimination and meaningful participation in
every aspect of life of the community.”256 The White House has also
characterized corruption as “a violation of basic human rights.”257
Thus, the United States is likely to support the internationalization of
the adjudication of anticorruption measures in order to level the
global playing field for American corporations.258
250. Id. at 5–8 (collecting examples of the global failure to prosecute “grand
corruption”).
251. Id. at 2.
252. Id. at 7.
253. See Yockey, supra note 168, at 828–29; see also G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/4, at iii, Foreword, United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31,
2003), http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/0850026_E.pdf [http://perma.cc/55US-MVPV].
254. 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (1977).
255. See Yockey, supra note 168, at 824–25.
256. Navi Pillay, High Comm’r for Human Rights, Opening Statement at Panel on the
Negative Impact of Corruption on Human Rights (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org
/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13131&LangID=e
[http://perma.cc/GP92-WHBX].
257. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (May 2010), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
[http://perma.cc/R9U4-L2YS].
258. WOLF, supra note 228, at 13.
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Finally, subject matter jurisdiction may also encompass businessto-business contract disputes that are currently channeled to
expensive, private, international commercial arbitration—currently
the only alternative to foreign courts. International commercial
arbitration will then truly become a form of alternative dispute
resolution.259
Beyond design features that are necessary for an ICCJ to be
politically viable, in order to solve the problem identified, an ICCJ
should also be designed to ensure due process and fundamental
fairness. The next few paragraphs detail institutional design features
that are based on international standards that promote judicial
independence and accountability and combat judicial corruption.260 It
will be immediately obvious why, as discussed above, reforms of
existing judiciaries to bring them into compliance with these
standards have been elusive. For the same reasons, a new
international institution that transcends the domestic-political
landscape may be more successful in complying with these standards.
Prior to detailing such criteria, it is also helpful to note that merely
removing the adjudicators, through the internationalization of the
judicial process from the control and influence of domestic executive
branches, legislators, politicians, and pressure groups, should have a
positive influence on independence and accountability. (Consider, for

259. See generally Globalizing Commercial Litigation, supra note 20 (arguing in part
that international commercial arbitration offers an insufficient solution to transnational
commercial litigation).
260. See generally, e.g., THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002)
(generally recognized as the most comprehensive standards on judicial conduct); COUNCIL
OF EUR., JUDGES: INDEPENDENCE, EFFICIENCY, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/CDCJ%20Recommendations/CMRec%282010
%2912E_%20judges.pdf [http://perma.cc/CC3H-Z6GV]; IBA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (INT’L BAR ASS’N 1982); USAID, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY (GUIDE) (Jan. 2002), http://pdf.usaid
.gov/pdf_docs/PNACM007.pdf [http://perma.cc/YAJ3-X5EL]; Combating Corruption in
Judicial Systems: Advocacy Toolkit, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2007), http://www.u4.no
/recommended-reading/transparency-international-advocacy-toolkit-combating-corruptionin-judicial-systems/ [http://perma.cc/NE9U-PB77]; Keith Handerson et al., Judicial
Transparency Checklist: Key Transparency Issues and Indicators to Promote Judicial
Independence and Accountability Reforms, IFES (2003) [hereinafter Judicial Transparency
Checklist], http://gateway.transparency.org/tools/detail/199 [http://perma.cc/Y2H6-FBT7];
Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, INT’L ASS’N JUD. INDEP.
JUST., http://www.jiwp.org/#!montreal-declaration/c1bue [http://perma.cc/A3G9-M9PC (dark
archive)] (the only document aimed specifically at the international judiciary); U.N. Office of
the High Commissioner, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx
[http://perma.cc/4LBF-CNDX] (adopted by the Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders).
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example, the suggestions below that remove political and corporate
influence from the case assignment process as well as the potential
comparative advantage that international watchdogs, such as the
international media, civil society, and academia have to be engaged,
vigilant, and effective).
There is some controversy regarding the appropriate meaning of
“independence” of international judges, as distinct from their
domestic counterparts, in recognition of the fact that international
judges are appointed by states and that they may decide cases that
implicate their home states’ interests. However, there is a consensus
on the general applicability of the concept of “independence” to all
international judges.261 Generally speaking, according to international
best practices, judicial selection should be conducted through an
objective and transparent appointment process. The appointment
process of international judges varies from court to court, but “the
general approach is similar. Each of the states involved . . . is entitled
to nominate a single candidate, who is then subject to an election
process along with the other nominees.”262 Appointment and
promotion should be based on a demonstrable record of competence
and integrity.263 Appointment decisions should be well documented
and publicly available.264 To maximize legitimacy with a global
constituency the bench should be diverse and representative of the
world community in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, and religion.

261. See, for example, the debate between Professors Yoo and Posner, who argue that
international tribunals’ effectiveness increases as their independence (from the member
states) decreases, and Professors Helfer and Slaughter, who emphatically challenge both
the empirical soundness and normative underpinnings of Yoo and Posner’s work.
Compare John Yoo & Eric Posner, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2005), and John Yoo & Eric Posner, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 957 (2005), with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States
Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 899 (2005). See also Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and
Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 275
(2003); Nathan J. Miller, Independence and the International Judiciary: General Overview
of the Issues 2 (Jan. 24, 2002), http://www.pict-pcti.org/activities/ILA_study_grp/ILA1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/63D3-PFPJ] (working draft) (providing background for the meeting of the
ILA Study Group in London, February 2, 2002).
262. See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 261, at 278. For a comprehensive discussion of
the nomination and selection processes at major international courts see Miller, supra note
261.
263. See Miller, supra note 261, at 10; Judicial Transparency Checklist, supra note 260,
at 27; U.N. Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 260, at ¶ 10.
264. See USAID, supra note 260, at 36, 37, 60, 71.
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Guarantees for judges should include either tenure for life or for
a long period of time.265 Judges should be compensated with adequate
salaries and pensions.266 Clear and objective criteria for judicial
advancement should be articulated, as should the grounds for
discipline and removal.267 Removal should only be possible for
misconduct or incapacity to carry out judicial function, and judicial
immunity should be extended for official actions but not for
corruption or other criminal conduct.268
Rules requiring judges to disclose their assets at appointment
time and periodically may be advisable.269 Such rules may be extended
to cover disclosure of family members’ assets and to cover other
judicial officers.270 Outside income while in office should be
prohibited or closely monitored.271 For example, it may be
appropriate to authorize but monitor honoraria for teaching and
speaking engagements.
A written code of ethics that meets international standards, with
a clear and effective mechanism for the enforcement of ethical rules,
should also be developed. Such a code should include clear conflict of
interest rules setting out, e.g., whether judges are allowed
membership in political parties or direct or indirect political activity.
Ethics training should be mandatory.
Case assignment should be carried out through a transparent
process with clearly articulated and transparent guidelines.272
Procedural rules should discourage excessive adjournments but also
ensure that judges have adequate time to hear cases and prepare
written judgments.273
In order to promote transparency and legal accountability, court
decisions should be written, reasoned, recorded, signed by the
authoring judges, and accessible to the public generally and
265. Miller, supra note 261, at 15; Combating Corruption in Judicial Systems, supra
note 260, at 35.
266. USAID, supra note 260, at 32; Miller, supra note 261, at 15; Combating
Corruption in Judicial Systems, supra note 260, at 35.
267. USAID, supra note 260, at 19; Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 261, at 275; Miller,
supra note 261, at 15; Combating Corruption in Judicial Systems, supra note 260, at 24, 35.
268. See Miller, supra note 261, at 12; Combating Corruption in Judicial Systems, supra
note 260, at 20, 24, 25, 35, 44, 47; U.N. Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 260,
¶¶ 18, 19.
269. Miller, supra note 261, at 9; Combating Corruption in Judicial Systems, supra note
260, at 24, 38.
270. Miller, supra note 261, at 9.
271. USAID, supra note 260, at 137.
272. Combating Corruption in Judicial Systems, supra note 260, at 24, 35.
273. See COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 260, at 17, 20.
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specifically via (indexed and searchable) electronic databases
available online for free.274 Court records should also be maintained
and accessible to the public. Architects of the court should also
consider whether the benefits of having recourse to an appellate
process, as a further check on the trial court, outweigh the costs of
adding such a layer of adjudication.
CONCLUSION
We have shown, through game theoretical tools as well as reallife illustration, that as far as transnational litigation is concerned,
corruption breeds more corruption. The fact that the judiciary in
much of the world either is corrupt, or is perceived to be corrupt, sets
up a prisoner’s dilemma whereby it is rational to act corruptly
preemptively. The prisoner’s dilemma also illuminates the fact that no
one—not repeat- or other plaintiffs nor repeat- or other defendants—
benefits from a system with the incentives created by the current
system. This means that it is in the interests not only of those
advocating human rights, workers’ rights, environmental protection,
and the like, but also of multinational corporations to change the
system to eliminate the prisoner’s dilemma.
We have also argued that of the various analytically possible
ways to solve a prisoner’s dilemma—facilitating repeat play,
facilitating side-bargains (between litigation adversaries), or setting
up an incorruptible tribunal—only the third is a potentially viable
solution in the case of transnational litigation. (Indeed, virtually all of
the solutions advocated by others and surveyed above involve a
significant role for either domestic, international, or foreign courts or
tribunals). Had there been an available incorruptible forum, like U.S.
courts, the problem could have been resolved without setting up a
new institution. However, none of the existing fora, as we have seen,
are both willing and able to take on the task, and reforming existing
fora, whether in the United States or the developing world, is
unrealistic in the foreseeable future. An ICCJ is therefore a potential
solution, and we hope others will join us in contemplating what
features might make such a solution attractive to as many
stakeholders as possible. Such a collective effort could lead to an
institutional solution that would benefit the causes of access to justice,
rule of law, and global economic development.

274. See id. at 8.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix contains light formalizations of the game theoretic
claims made in the main body of the Article. It may safely be skipped
by those who believe (or are willing to suspend disbelief in) our
analytic assertions.
A. Characterization of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Formally, we can depict the simplest version of the prisoner’s
dilemma in tabular form as follows:
Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

A, A

B, C

Defect

C, B

D, D

In this visualization, player one chooses between the columns,
player two chooses between the rows, and player one’s payoff is listed
first. A is the mutual cooperation payoff, and B is the payoff a player
gets when he manages to successfully “sucker” the other player—
defect while the other player cooperates. C is the “sucker’s payoff,”
and D is the payoff each player gets when both players defect.
In order for the game just described to constitute a true prisoner’s
dilemma, defection must be a strictly dominant strategy for each player
(each player must be better off defecting), and the mutual defection
payoff must be strictly worse than the mutual cooperation payoff. That
is, the game is a prisoner’s dilemma when B > A (each player prefers
defecting when the other is cooperating), D > C (each player prefers
defecting when the other is defecting), and A > D (B > A > D > C).275
As constructed, the prisoner’s dilemma represents a costly failure of
cooperation: the only (one-round) Nash equilibrium to the game is
mutual defection, even though mutual defection is worse for everyone
than mutual cooperation.
The attentive reader will notice that in the simplest version, it is
assumed that the players have symmetric payoffs. This assumption is
easily relaxed, in which case by convention we can denote each player’s
version of the payoff by a subscript (A1, A2, etc.). In that case, a
275. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1391–92. Note that Axelrod and Hamilton
specify an additional condition on a prisoner’s dilemma, but that condition (which is
meant to rule out repeated play in which the players trade off sucker’s payoffs, see id. at
1396 n.17) does not apply in the litigation context.
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prisoner’s dilemma is where B1 > A1 > D1 > C1 and B2 > A2 > D2 > C2.
No assumptions need be made about the relationship of players’
payoffs to one another, provided we make the simpler assumption that
the players cannot make enforceable side-bargains with one another to
break the model.276
B.

When Is Litigation a Prisoner’s Dilemma?

We now state the conditions under which litigation is a prisoner’s
dilemma. We begin by defining some variables. Let:
i, j be litigants.277
Bi be the amount that litigant i pays to carry out a corrupting act
(e.g., the amount of the bribe paid to the judge, the risk of being
punished, the additional litigation costs incurred by transferring the
case from an honest to a corrupted forum, etc.).
Ci be litigant i’s noncorruption costs.
V be the amount in dispute.278
Mi be the legal merits of i’s case, expressed as i’s probability of
winning without a corrupting act (Mi + Mj = 1).279
Pib be i’s probability of winning having carried out a corrupting act
of cost Bi (the b subscript will be dropped where appropriate); the
supposition is that Pi is an increasing function of Bi and Mi. For the
limiting case in which litigant i does not engage in a corrupting act,
Pi = Mi.
Given those definitions, let litigant i’s payoff for litigating be
Li = PiV – Ci – Bi. Then, litigant i has the opportunity to corrupt a court
if there is some positive Bi such that PibV – Bi > MiV.
Observe that the noncorrupt cost terms, being constant, may be
safely dropped and that this model depends on the assumption that Bi
is within i’s budget.280 Then PibV – Bi > MiV describes the situation
276. The possibility of enforceable side-bargains would make matters significantly more
complicated. However, if such a bargain is enforceable, we are no longer playing a prisoner’s
dilemma: the whole idea of a prisoner’s dilemma is that cooperation between the parties is
not enforceable. See discussion, supra Section I.B.1 (suggesting that making enforceable sidebargains is unlikely in the adversarial setting of a litigation).
277. For simplicity, we assume two-party litigation, although the model ought to be
extendible to multiparty litigation without serious difficulty.
278. We assume that each party has the same amount at stake, i.e., that the suit in
question is purely one for monetary damages. Again, the model ought to be extendible to
situations where the parties value the litigation at different rates without serious difficulty.
279. This model assumes that a corrupted court still has to pay some attention to the
merits of a case, even if only for appearance’s sake, but that corruption will induce the court
to favor the briber when there is room for disagreement on either side.
280. I.e., that no party may be priced out of the competition by litigation costs, that there
are diminishing returns to corrupting act costs (e.g., because judges are only so greedy,
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where player i prefers unilateral defection to mutual cooperation.
Whether such a Bi exists depends on the impact of Bi on Pi: where it is
very costly to carry out a corrupting act relative to the amount in
dispute, or where corrupting acts make very little difference to the
ultimate probability of winning, no such Bi will exist.
Suppose that player i is corrupting. Player j will also have an
incentive to corrupt where there is some Bj such that PjCbV – Bj > MjCV.
Here PjCb and MjC represent the corruption and no-corruption
probabilities, respectively, for j’s victory conditional on i’s having
corrupted the court (the timing of the two corrupting opportunities
makes no difference). Informally, the given inequality will be satisfied
where paying a compensatory bribe (etc.) will lead the corrupt judge to
shift enough of the probability mass for winning back in j’s favor to
make it worth j’s while to pay the amount demanded.
Accordingly, corruption will be a strictly dominant strategy when
PibV – Bi > MiV (player i prefers unilateral corruption to mutual
honesty), PjbV – Bj > MjV (player j prefers unilateral corruption to
mutual honesty), PiCbV – Bi > MiCV (player i prefers mutual corruption
to being the only noncorrupter), and PjCbV – Bj > MjCV (player j prefers
mutual corruption to being the only noncorrupter).
In such a situation, the litigation will be a prisoner’s dilemma when
the litigants also prefer mutual honesty to mutual corruption, i.e., when
MiV > PiCbV – Bi and equivalently with the appropriate change in
subscripts for j. Note that this will be true (inter alia) for all nonzero B
in all cases where the players are symmetric in their power to corrupt,
e.g., where players cannot outbid one another due to wealth constraints
or systemic superiority, and where there is no positional advantage
relative to being the first or second briber (i.e., where PiCb = PjCb). In
other cases, the game may not be a formal prisoner’s dilemma, because
one player may prefer the mutual bribery outcome, however, many of
the systemic concerns will be the same as those described in the text.
C.

Modeling Noncorrupt Appeals and Enforcement Actions

In the text, we claimed that the opportunity for parties to take
appeals to or the requirement they seek enforcement in incorruptible
fora does not change the underlying model, so long as an original
corrupt judgment makes it more likely that the player who procures it

perhaps because of the different levels of per capita wealth in the developed and developing
world), or that the costs of corrupting acts like bribes necessary to conclusively outbid the
other party are so large that they swamp the expected return of the litigation.

94 N.C. L. REV. 751 (2016)

816

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

will win the lawsuit than if the parties had litigated in the incorruptible
forum in the first place (we call this a “status quo effect”).
To see this, suppose there are two jurisdictions: the home
jurisdiction (H) and the enforcement jurisdiction (E), where H is
corruptible and E is not. A party has the choice of procuring a corrupt
judgment in H and trying to enforce it in E, or simply attempting to win
a noncorrupt judgment directly in E. Assume that her probability of
winning in E is Π, and that there is positive probability Φ that a
corruptly procured judgment in H will be enforced in E. To model the
assumption of a status quo effect, we specify that Φ > Π . Let us further
assume (the key assumption) that if E refuses to enforce a judgment
from H, the parties will have the opportunity to relitigate the merits in
E.
Then, a party will prefer to procure a corrupt judgment in H when
ΦV – K + (1 – Φ)( ΠV – C) > ΠV – C. In that inequality, V, as before, is
the value of the litigation, C is the cost of litigating in E, and L maps
the additional costs to the party from seeking the corrupt judgment in
H, including corrupting and litigation costs in H as well as additional
litigation costs from the enforcement action in E, risk-adjusted
penalties for getting caught at corruption, etc. Essentially, a litigant
pays K for the privilege of getting an extra round of litigation at the
beginning with a thumb on the scale in her favor.
After some algebra, the inequality reduces to
,
illustrating that a litigant will be more likely to prefer to procure a
corrupt judgment as the costs of litigating fairly rise, the costs of
litigating corruptly decrease, the likelihood of enforcing a corruptly
procured judgment increases, and so forth. But so long as that
inequality holds, the strategic structure of the overall litigation holds: if
the litigation in E is round N, then in round N – 1, a party will prefer to
defect from honest litigation in H if he can get away with it; so long as it
is better to corrupt in round N – 1 if the other player is bribing, the
payoffs, viewed from round N – 1, still have the structure of a prisoner’s
dilemma. Accordingly, the game as a whole is still subject to the same
kind of backward induction solution that leads to the standard subgame
perfect equilibrium of a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: mutual
defection.

